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Unraveling Hizbullah’s Institutional Paradox:  
State Interventionist Thought Versus Neoliberal Practices 
 
Meghry Khoshian 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Scholarship addressing Hizbullah’s military and political aspects is vast. Yet, the 
literature is relatively limited when examining Hizbullah as a social service provider. 
This thesis looks at the party as a social and educational service provider and studies the 
party’s extensive networks and organizations that have improved the socio-economic 
status of the Shi‘as, but have also enhanced the party’s reputation and enabled it to have 
control over a substantial part of the Shi‘a community. Hizbullah’s practices have 
matched the neoliberal policies that the party always condemned, thus hindering the 
emergence of the “strong, capable and just” Lebanese state that the party calls for. 
Hizbullah provides vast social and educational services to enhance its resistance society 
and expand it. Social and educational institutions are therefore political tools to mobilize 
supporters and widen the party’s scope of influence. They establish political loyalty and 
strengthen the party’s ties with the Shi‘a community, especially when the party succeeds 
in presenting these services as part of the enhancement of the ‘resistance society’. 
 
Keywords: Hizbullah, Neoliberal Practices, Social services, Welfare Organizations, 
Educational Institutions 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1-Introduction 
No party’s evolution has caused controversy and created implications that have 
affected the whole country as Hizbullah’s. From its early origins till present, Hizbullah has 
always been in the heart of not only domestic but also regional turmoil. The party has 
evolved from being a revolutionary movement propagating a religious ideology and a rigid 
discourse against the existing political system in Lebanon into a pragmatic political party as 
well as an efficient service provider to Shi‘as, fitting well into the Lebanese sectarian 
political structure. Nonetheless, throughout these changes, the party has always been subject 
to debates and questions about its loyalties, intentions, and doctrines. 
Although the literature about the Shi‘as of Lebanon is large, scholarship about them 
before the second half of the twentieth century is not controversial at all; all research 
examines the same subject: that Shi‘as were impoverished and misrepresented since the 
creation of the Lebanese state. Shi‘a existence in Lebanon goes back to the 9th century A.C. 
when they established themselves in the Jabal Amel region, and some of them resided in the 
northern Bekaa Valley (Alagha 2006: 19). Since then, the Shi‘as were identified as a poor 
minority whose maltreatment never seemed to end. As early as the 14
th
 century Shi‘as were 
expelled by the Mamluks from their regions and sent to peripheral regions away from the 
Mamluks’ central ruling areas. Even when the Mamluk dynasty fell and the Ottoman Empire 
was established, the Lebanese Shi‘as found themselves in a position of defending themselves 
against the Sunni Ottomans (Alagha 2006: 19-20). Last but not least, during the French 
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mandate and at the announcement of Lebanon’s 1943 independence, Shi‘as were 
misrepresented and marginalized. 
The literature on the Shi‘as began to change as Shi‘a political mobilization began to 
change. The first stirrings of change came in late 1950s and early 1960s when Shi‘as started 
to be exposed to modernity due to internal and external migration (Norton 1985). Then 
arrived Imam Mussa Al-Sadr, who mobilized the Shi‘as, organized them politically, and 
called for a better political representation and fairer distribution of socio-economic 
conditions. He also worked to form an effective Shi‘a civil society independent of the state; 
this gave fruit to the formation of the Islamic Shi‘a Higher Council (Alagha 2006: 23; Hazran 
2009). Al-Sadr’s appearance marked the birth of political Shiism in Lebanon (Marei 2010). 
However, Al-Sadr did not aim to seize power; he strived to increase Shi‘a engagement in the 
state and advance their political rights (Hazran 2009). Moreover, even though his efforts 
were directed towards serving the various socio-economic and political interests of the 
Shi‘as, al-Sadr called for safeguarding the Lebanese republic. Likewise, he worked within 
the confessional system of Lebanon under the legitimacy of the Lebanese state (Alagha 2006: 
29-30). When his expectations to achieve reforms by peaceful means proved stillborn, Al-
Sadr founded the Movement of the Deprived (sometimes known as Movement of the 
Disinherited) in 1974. And by the break of the Lebanese civil war, this Movement developed 
into a military faction known as Amal Movement
1
 (Norton 1987: 47-49), to bring in social 
reforms but essentially to fight for the liberation of Southern Lebanon from Israeli 
occupation. 
                                                          
1
Acronym for Afwaj Almouqawama Al Loubnaniya or the Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance. 
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Four years after establishing the Amal movement, Al-Sadr disappeared during a trip 
to Libya. Then came the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Israeli invasion of 1982, and Amal’s 
new leader Nabih Berri’s decision to participate in the National Salvation Committee (NSC) 
formed in the wake of the invasion. This resulted in a split within Amal. The NSC was 
formed alongside with the Maronite leader and Israeli ally Bashir Gemayel. The Islamic 
faction of Amal broke away and founded the party of God, Hizbullah (Salloukh and 
Mikaelian 2011). This brought in the biggest transformation in the history of the Shi‘as of 
Lebanon, and initiated a stage of radical institutionalization in contrast with Imam Al-Sadr’s 
engagement policy with the state, paving the road to Shi‘a ascendency and gradually bringing 
them to the center of Lebanese politics. 
The emergence of Hizbullah was thus “based on ideological, social, political, and 
economical mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab, and Islamic context” (Alagha 2006: 35). 
During its early years the party followed a radical approach having an uncompromising 
stance towards the Lebanese political system. The term political Shi‘ism was confined to a 
movement preaching Islamic resistance and discrediting the state. This persisted until the 
1989 Ta’if Accord which ended the Lebanese civil war. Ta’if marked the beginning of a new 
stage in the path of Hizbullah. Some scholars refer to this stage as “Phase Two” of the Party 
of God (Salloukh and Mikaelian 2011). Starting in 1992, Hizbullah decided to turn the page 
of strict military action and radicalization and begin a new chapter denoted by political 
accommodation. It was during this phase that the party claimed to be part of the Lebanese 
state. It was also during this stage that Hizbullah invested heavily in its social service 
networks and organizations, becoming an efficient service provider for a substantial group of 
the Shi‘a population. But while the party had been calling for state reforms, on the ground 
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Hizbullah was undertaking its own reforms to its own population totally independent from 
the state. 
This study examines the socio-economic and educational services of Hizbullah. It 
portrays the party of God as a vast social service provider. It shows how Hizbullah: (1) went 
against its own social and economic thought in providing social services; (2) succeeded in 
changing the status of the underdeveloped, marginalized, and uneducated Shi‘as through its 
vast network of various social, health, and educational institutions; and (3) as service 
provider gained substantial popularity among the Lebanese Shi‘as. This thesis also analyzes 
the two official manifestos of the party - 1985 Open Letter and 2009 Manifesto - showing the 
evolution of the party during its existence years, trying to reason these evolutions, yet 
demonstrating the pro-state inclination of the party in its ideological thought throughout its 
years. In addition, it delves into the constituents of Hizbullah’s strength at the socio-
economic and educational levels that helped enhance the status of the Shi‘as in Lebanon, 
elevated their social standing, and contributed to the establishment of the “resistance society” 
(Abdel-Samad and Flanigan 2011; Harb and Leenders 2005). 
Moreover, the study draws the social and economic thought of Hizbullah through 
documents presented by party officials and interviews conducted with them. It then 
demonstrates the clash between the neo-liberal practices and policies of the party and its state 
interventionist thought, without overlooking the double-edge success of Hizbullah’s services: 
first for the Shi‘as, through improving their socio-economic status, and second for the party 
itself because its popularity grew and was enhanced. Indeed, the party, through its networks, 
succeeded in transforming the Shi‘a “victimization complex into meaningful values of 
justice, solidarity, community, sacrifice, progress etc – which, in turn, instigate high self-
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esteem and a solid sense of pride” (Harb and Leenders 2005). In addition to the above, the 
study revisits the concept of political Shi‘ism. Rather than altering this concept regularly to 
fit the developments of Hizbullah’s discourse, this study places Hizbullah’s political and 
ideological considerations and the party’s social, economic, and educational features under 
the notion of the “resistance society”. This latter makes possible the understanding of 
resistance as a mission and a choice of life. And as such, resistance is understood beyond 
combat and includes social and political jihad as well (Harb and Leenders 2005). 
Thus, this thesis contributes to the relatively scarce academic literature that examines 
the non-military aspect of Lebanon’s Shi‘as. It concentrates on the community’s vast 
economic, social, and educational developments; furthermore, it sheds light on the 
emergence of self-conscious and self-reliant Shi‘as mobilized by the mission of resistance as 
a “methodology” (Harb and Leenders 2005). This entails unpacking the social and economic 
thought of Hizbullah. Studying this aspect of Hizbullah is uncommon since researchers have 
mostly showed interest in the party’s military and political activity. Moreover, all the studies 
about Lebanese Shi‘as and Hizbullah have either analyzed the theoretical aspect of 
Hizbullah’s thought and doctrines or the practical one. This thesis tries to study both aspects 
together, showing the points of divergence and friction between the two and analyzing the 
motives and rationales behind this divergence. In short, this study shows that although 
Hizbullah’s practices of establishing vast private social networks conflicted with the political 
thought that brought the party into existence, the party saw Shi‘a ascendency through these 
institutions. Therefore these non-political networks of Hizbullah shall be considered as 
crucial as the political ones in instituting a resistance culture and identity, and in 
understanding the ascendency of Shi‘a socio-political status. 
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1.2-Literature Review 
The literature dealing with the Shi‘as of Lebanon in general and Hizbullah in 
particular considers the year 1992 to be the decisive point when Hizbullah announced its 
participation in Lebanese parliamentary elections. The elections possessed a particular 
significance since they were the first postwar elections for Lebanon, and the first in which 
Hizbullah participated after attacking and denying the Lebanese state for the preceding eight 
years. Some scholars interpreted this as a mere change in approach: a participatory rather 
than revolutionary route to establish an Islamic state (Hamzeh 2004: 5). Others viewed this 
decision as the result of external factors, namely the victory of reformers over conservatives 
in Iranian domestic politics and their pragmatic strategy (Harb 2007). Hence, transnational 
goals and factors were what mattered and they surpassed national ones. Another group of 
scholars saw this shift of strategy as a constructive step towards a system which became 
relatively more equitable in terms of distribution of power, decreased Maronite hegemony, 
and stipulated the abolishment of political sectarianism in the future (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 
26-27).  
Some scholars claimed that after its decision to participate in the 1992 elections, 
Hizbullah became a legal domestic political party in Lebanon, and hence was “lebanonized”. 
Nizar Hamzeh defined this term as Hizbullah’s gradual “normalization” of political activities 
and its becoming a political party accommodated within the domestic politics of the country 
(Hamzeh: 1993). Lara Deeb labeled Hizbullah after this stage as a “clean” political party 
with a reputation of being a capable player on local and national levels (Deeb: 2006). This 
was obvious from the public campaigns of its leaders who began advocating sectarian 
coexistence in the country. Similarly, Amal Saad-Ghorayeb perceived Lebanonization as part 
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of the strategy of self-preservation where perception towards domestic political system 
changed (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 26-29). Political and ideological considerations had 
intertwined, resulting in a constructive outcome starting the year 1992, when Shi‘as began 
manifesting a Lebanese identity and carrying out resistance activities under nationalistic 
frameworks. Thus, these scholars describe Hizbullah in this new post-Ta’if stage as being 
driven by political considerations rather than purely ideological choices. 
At the other extreme, Hizbullah is viewed as a terrorist organization. This connotation 
became popular especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. 
Only a year after these attacks, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Faith declared that 
Hizbullah is one of the most dangerous terrorist networks (Azani 2009: 202). In fact, as early 
as the middle 1980s, the United States and Israel labeled Hizbullah a terrorist movement, but 
the September 11 attacks triggered much international attention to terrorism and suddenly 
many military movements and liberation organizations were regarded as terrorist 
organizations. Hence, Australia, Canada, United Kindgom, and Netherlands successively 
categorized Hizbullah as a terrorist network (Azani 2009: 202).  
Others view Hizbullah’s loyalties and affiliations as belonging not to Lebanon but to 
Iran, and explain the shift in Hizbullah’s stance in the early 1990s as a result of the victory of 
Iranian reformers over the conservatives and their encouragement of the party of God to 
“demilitarize its identity and build a broader base in society” (Hamzeh 1993: 323). In fact, 
these scholars accuse Hizbullah as always being a transnational party where its loyalties to 
Iran transcend its national loyalties. Moreover, they never fail to return to Hizbullah’s 1985 
Open Letter - where the party called for the establishment of an Islamic republic - to support 
their claim. Therefore, they explain Hizbullah’s post-Ta’if stage as the party’s pragmatic 
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acceptance of the shifts in the regional politics, labeling the party as a “Janus-faced” 
organization that retains fierce commitment to its ideology but is now engaged in the same 
system that it denounced heavily (Norton 2007).  
Nevertheless, only limited research has been made on the non-political dimension of 
its Lebanonization. Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders have come closest to this dimension 
while speaking about two levels of activities resulting from the 1992 pragmatic turn: political 
and social. The first is characterized by the success of Hizbullah in participating in the 
political life of the country, while the second is highlighted through the vast social, health, 
and educational services that the party offers to the Shi‘a community in general and those 
affiliated with it in particular (Harb and Leenders, 2005).  
Yet empirical evidence has been in short supply. Few researchers, but mainly 
Catherine Le Thomas, emphasize the phenomenon of social development of Shi‘as 
empirically. Le Thomas highlights the dynamic role of Hizbullah even within the Lebanese 
consociational system and the resources that it draws on to mobilize supporters as well as to 
widen its influence. She further stresses the coherence and size of Hizbullah’s social 
development program that has enabled the party to establish a cultural hegemony “on a much 
broader foundation than that of its active militants” (Le Thomas 2010). Le Thomas 
concentrates on the party’s educational system and its establishment of schools to 
demonstrate the constructive roles that Hizbullah controlled or affiliated schools play in 
producing and expanding the “universe of the resistance society” and how do these schools 
create an educated Islamic Shi‘a society in Lebanon (Le Thomas 2010). 
Nor is there much scholarship on the theoretical thought of Hizbullah with respect to 
the party’s non-military and non-political outlook. Furthermore, the limited literature on the 
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social and educational dimensions mentions part of the story: how Hizbullah is successful 
and efficient in providing services to its population, regardless of whether the party wants to 
enhance its own popularity, become an active actor in the Lebanese political life, or simply 
aid its followers. Indeed, when writing about the efficiency of the party, researchers fail to 
take into account that the successful practices of the party are in fact contradictory with its 
state interventionist philosophy. This thesis demonstrates the strength of Hizbullah as a social 
service provider. It analyzes the party’s social and educational networks through studying 
various Hizbullah organizations. It demonstrates how once a military organization, Hizbullah 
is now an octopus organization having socio-economic, youth, and educational branches 
aside from politics and military, all contributing to the socio-economic advancement of the 
Lebanese Shi‘as. The thesis underscores, however, that all these constructive practices of 
Hizbullah in fact conflict with its theoretical thought.  
1.3-Research Questions 
1. The post-Ta’if era marked the socio-economic expansion of Hizbullah. Why did 
the party invest heavily in developing a huge socio-economic base and in building various 
networks? The post-Ta’if era marks the engagement of Hizbullah in the political life of 
Lebanon and its abandoning its extreme rejectionist standpoints. This thesis will refer to this 
transformation by analyzing the party’s Open letter of 1985 and comparing it to the recent 
2009 manifesto. Hence, Hizbullah’s launching of socio-economic developmental goals 
coincided with the party’s domestication. The party started offering benefits and aid, and 
later large-scale educational services to its supporters, and established multiple social 
institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in order to enhance Shi‘a social 
status and make them self-assured of their multi-facet superiority in Lebanon. As Le Thomas 
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puts it, the party brought together political, religious, and cultural components which produce 
a “comprehensive model that aims to foster (a) resistance-oriented behavioral pattern” 
(2010). The powerful social base that the party was able to establish is claimed to 
compensate for the deficiencies of the Lebanese state in the area of social and economic 
development. However, because of these vast institutions the party was able to win over the 
loyalties of the Shi‘as and became an agent of “political recruitment, indoctrination and 
control and integrated mobilization of the Shi‘a community” (Salloukh and Mikaelian, 2011). 
This thesis surveys the socio-economic and educational aspects of Hizbullah’s power 
in order to show how they enhanced the Shi‘a standing in Lebanon, constructed a “Shi‘a 
identity among them” and increased the popularity of Hizbullah. Therefore these factors are 
as crucial as the political in sustaining Hizbullah’s standing within the Shi‘a community. It is 
not an exaggeration to claim that Hizbullah has played an important role in improving the 
socio-economic standing of the Shi‘a society in Lebanon. Moreover, the service oriented 
networks have cemented the party’s relationship with its community, fostering its reputation 
and popularity among them.  
2. The Resistance Society is a concept characterizing the mission of Hizbullah. How 
and why has Hizbullah broadened its activities to include social and educational networks 
under the concept of the Resistance Society? Since its establishment, resistance has always 
been Hizbullah’s principal goal. In the party’s view, the concept of resistance should be the 
mission of every Shi‘a. From the 1985 Open letter till the 2009 New Manifesto, Hizbullah 
has preached resistance as a choice of life. In fact, this concept has remained unchangeable 
even in the midst of Hizbullah’s transformation and its acknowledgement of the birth of a 
Lebanese regime after Ta’if. The party defines resistance as the “righteous combat, supported 
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by God, which inevitably leads to victory” (Harb and Leenders 2005). Prior to the era of 
Hizbullah, the Shi‘a community had been classified as disinherited (mahrumeen). Hizbullah 
introduced the notion of resistance society to change the concept of disinherited to 
disempowered (mustad‘afeen). The latter provokes struggle, change, and transformation, 
whereas the former only shows helplessness and inaction (Harb and Leenders 2005). 
Nonetheless, prior to the Ta’if agreement resistance was only military, aiming to fight 
Zionism. Later, Hizbullah broadened its scope to include political and social activities as 
well. Hence, resistance went beyond the battlefield and became a guide for the 
transformation of the Shi‘as into responsible, righteous, and self-conscious citizens. It 
became a culture and an identity (Harb and Leenders 2005). 
This thesis unpacks Hizbullah’s social networks and educational institutions. 
Moreover, the developments of these institutions and their success will be linked to the 
concept of the resistance society that Hizbullah aims to establish and expand. This society is 
a representation of educated civilians who are yet fighters, nationals yet driven by Shi‘a 
ideology. Hence Hizbullah has been successful in making use of its robust social service unit 
to improve the standing of Shi‘as in Lebanon, strengthen a Shi‘a sense of community, and 
tighten its relationship with this community. 
3. Finally, despite the successes of Hizbullah, the party’s performance in social and 
economic spheres came into friction with Hizbullah’s original ideology and Shi‘a thought. 
How does this contraction arise? What are the justifications offered by Hizbullah? 
Hizbullah’s social networks aim at mobilizing the Shi‘a individual, solidifying his/her self-
perception, and involving him/her actively in the party’s affairs. These non-military and non-
political networks aim at strengthening Shi‘a society through individual participation, private 
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sector engagement, and mass mobilization. But this has meant bringing in some neoliberal 
characteristics in terms of private sector participation, individual choices, and NGO 
initiatives. This goes against the social and economic thought of the party and creates 
interesting contradictions between the party’s theory and practice.  
This thesis first draws the social and economic thought of Hizbullah; it then 
thoroughly explores the practices of the party in social and professional fields in order to 
demonstrate the differences between these two. However, and after acknowledging these 
differences between theory and practice, interviews with Hizbullah’s officials are used to 
explore the party’s justifications of these contradictions. Furthermore, the efficient 
performance and the vast benefits generated by Hizbullah institutions also tend to overlook 
the contradictory aspects between the theoretical thought and practice, and look at the party 
as a successful service provider especially in a sectarian country like Lebanon. 
1.4-Methodology 
A qualitative research approach is used to explain how Hizbullah plays a fundamental 
role in improving the status of the Shi‘a community in Lebanon. In general, qualitative 
methods are used to understand attitudes and experiences of a certain group or community. 
This approach is used when answering questions about “‘what’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a 
phenomenon rather than ‘how many’ or ‘how much’” (Brikci and Green 2007). Among the 
most common approaches in qualitative methods are in-depth interviews, case studies, and 
meticulous analysis. This research study will use these tools to produce a rich and 
comprehensive study about the strength of Hizbullah on the socio-economic, professional, 
and educational levels, and how the party succeeded in enhancing the social standing of the 
Lebanese Shi‘as.  
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Interviews with party officials, political representatives, and professionals were 
conducted to analyze the state interventionist socioeconomic thought of Hizbullah against its 
neo-liberal practices. A survey of the existing literature and in-depth case studies were used 
when dealing with the socio-economic power of Hizbullah. That section particularly 
underlines the vast social networks of Hizbullah and examines some of the party’s main 
organizations and networks, dividing them into (a) reconstruction, (b) health, and (3) charity. 
Furthermore, available empirical data is utilized to show the efficiency, potency, and impact 
of these organizations and movements. As is presented above, case studies are common in 
qualitative research because they are “information rich” and offer helpful manifestations of 
the topic under study (Patton 2002). In examining the main NGOs of Hizbullah, both its 
structural and organizational components are looked at.  
The educational dimension examines Hizbullah’s vast educational institutions and 
agencies. Here, the focus is on Hizbullah-sponsored - controlled as well as affiliated - schools 
and their impact to Hizbullah’s mission of elevating the Shi‘as socio-economically and 
expanding the network of resistance society. The section includes a thorough and 
comparative analysis about Hizbullah sponsored and affiliated schools and how do they 
shape the Shi‘a generations. Moreover, high-ranked administrators were interviewed to 
understand better the mission of these educational institutions. 
1.5-Map of thesis 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. After a brief introduction about the party, the 
second chapter presents a theoretical framework that compares the 1985 and 2009 doctrines 
of Hizbullah to demonstrate the evolution of the movement to become a legitimate party 
playing by the sectarian rules of the system as well as its pro-state tendency. Moreover, the 
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chapter draws out the conflict between the state interventionist thought of Hizbullah and its 
neoliberal practices. Chapter three examines the socio-economic aspect of Hizbullah’s 
power. The chapter highlights the main networks of the party as well as its most important 
NGOs in the fields of reconstruction, health, and charity. Chapter four concentrates on 
advancements in the educational field. Finally, the last chapter summarizes the argument of 
the thesis and explores future possibilities and prospects regarding Hizbullah’s revolution 
within the Lebanese Shi‘a community, and in the Lebanese and regional contexts. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BETWEEN STATE INTERVENTIONIST THOUGHT AND 
NEO-LIBERAL PRACTICE 
2.1-Introduction 
On 16 February 1985, Hizbullah issued its first document entitled “Open Letter to the 
Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World” (Alagha 2006: 223-238). The Letter introduced the 
identity of the party of God, announced their mission to establish an Islamic state in 
Lebanon, and declared their fight against the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Israel, France, and Maronite hegemony over the Lebanese state 
(Hizbullah 1985). The party made it clear that it considers the Lebanese state highly unjust 
due to the confessional system that it is based upon, and therefore rejects it (Salloukh and 
Mikaelian 2011). However, only seven years after the declaration of the Open Letter, some 
of its maxims, especially those related to domestic politics, were considered outdated. Local 
and international developments forced Hizbullah to transform its rejectionist approaches into 
integrative ones, direct its strategies towards national goals, and replace some fundamental 
positions by pragmatic choices. This was necessary for the party to sustain its fight against 
Israel, but also to enhance its standing within the Shi‘a community (Azani 2009: 85). This 
participatory approach began in the post-Tai’f era, and was crystallized in the 2009 
Manifesto of Hizbullah. Unlike the Open Letter, the Manifesto stressed the national identity 
of Hizbullah and its acceptance and participation in the confessional political life of the 
country. 
This chapter identifies the theoretical and ideological frameworks upon which 
Hizbullah was founded, and its socio-economic program. It analyzes the founding letter of 
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Hizbullah then examines the party’s 2009 Manifesto to show how ideology has been 
transformed to fit the behavioral patterns of the Shi‘a community. Finally, it looks at the 
socio-economic thought of Hizbullah and shows how the party’s practices do not reflect its 
theoretical framework.  
2.2-From Radicalism to Pragmatism: how denunciation changed to 
acceptance 
The rejection of the Lebanese state and the call to establish an Islamic republic was 
made public in the famous “Open Letter” which ended Hizbullah’s secret existence and 
moved it into the public realm (Lamb 2009). The letter was read on February16, 1985 by 
Hizbullah spokesman Sheikh Ibrahim Amine Al-Sayyed from the al-Ouzai Mosque exactly 
one year after the assassination of Hizbullah leader Sheik Ragheb Harb, and was 
simultaneously published in al-Safir newspaper as “Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati 
Wajahaha Hizbullah ila al-Mustad‘afin fi Lubnan wal ‘Alam.2 It was then spread throughout 
the country and the region, announcing Hizbullah as an existing force in the country, and 
appealing and mobilizing the “oppressed” Muslims. The Open Letter was Hizbullah’s first 
manifesto and revealed its political ideology (Alagha 2011: 15). It specified the party’s 
ideology and objectives, its stance vis-à-vis the world and Christians, and the fight against 
Israel and its allies. 
The main themes of the Open Letter are the establishment of an Islamic state, pan-
Arabism, Anti-Imperialism, and the division of the world between oppressors and oppressed, 
where Hizbullah represented the latter (Alagha 2011: 15). Although the letter signified a shift 
                                                          
2  Nass al-risala al-maftuha allati wajahaha Hizbullah ila al-mustad‘afin fi Lubnan wal ‘alam. al-Safir 
Newspaper, February 16, 1985 
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by Hizbullah from a secret apparatus and into a military organization, it did not identify this 
militant movement as being a political party in Lebanon or even as having a political cadre 
(Hizbullah 1985). In fact, Hizbullah viewed the Lebanese system as unjust because of the 
discriminatory nature of the confessional system upon which the whole political life of the 
country is built, and called for the establishment of an Islamic republic. Hizbullah even 
extended the invitation of replacing the state to all non-Muslims, and called upon them to 
open themselves to Islam (Hizbullah 1985). 
According to the Open Letter, jihad and martyrdom against the oppressors are 
missions to be fulfilled by all Muslims. The United States, Israel, NATO, France, and the 
Phalangists of Lebanon are all enemies to be fought against. World imperialism was 
condemned since it was considered the source of oppression, and hence there was a call to 
fight against it as well (Hizbullah 1985). Communism and capitalism were rejected, both 
considered inapplicable to Imam Khomeini’s division of the world into oppressors versus 
oppressed (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 16). The last section of the letter was devoted to the 
denunciation and rejection of Israel, refusing any types of negotiation with it, and calling for 
its destruction (Hizbullah 1985). 
The late 1980s as well as the beginning of the last decade of the 20
th
 century were 
decisive years on the domestic, regional and international levels. Internationally, the Soviet 
Union along with the Communist bloc had collapsed, leading to the establishment of a 
unipolar world order led by the United States (Alagha 2011: 22). On the regional level, the 
Iran-Iraq war had ended with the defeat of the former, and the pragmatists/reformists had 
won the elections over the conservatives in Iran. In fact, this change was also mirrored 
domestically in Hizbullah’s leadership whereby the pragmatist group represented by Abbas 
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al-Mussawi won over the militant group led by Subhi Tufaily and Hussein Al-Mussawi 
(Hamzeh 2004; Abi Saab 2009: 232; Salloukh and Mikaelian 2011). The new pragmatic 
leadership of Hizbullah saw these developments as real threats to its own status and had to 
cope with them cleverly in order to sustain its fight against Israel while at the same time 
enhancing its standing within the Shi‘a community (Azani 2009: 85). Therefore, international 
and regional events made it necessary for Hizbullah to change orientation and redefine its 
short-term interests to achieve long-term goals (Alagha 2011: 22). Although basic ideological 
facts would remain intact, it was clear that important standpoints and attitudes had to be 
reconsidered. 
The change was not dramatic, however. As early as in 1994, and in an interview with 
al-Bilad newspaper
3
, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah had pointed to the possibility of 
revising the Open Letter. Some years later, in 2002, deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Na‘im 
Qassem proclaimed that a lot has changed reflecting the changing circumstances that 
undoubtedly affected the movement (Alagha 2011: 25). The new leadership worked on 
transforming the movement into a party having a Lebanese character. It then began to plan a 
new political order for Lebanon and initiate actions aiming to increase Hizbullah’s credibility 
within the Shi‘a community as well as to integrate the party in the Lebanese system, without 
abandoning its mission of resistance. The initial harvest came with the success of Hizbullah 
in the 1992 parliamentary elections (Alagha 2011: 88-91). 
When the Ta’if agreement was implemented to end the 15-year-old Lebanese civil 
war, Hizbullah decided to accommodate itself to the Lebanese confessional system, entering 
into alliances beyond sectarian lines (Hamzeh 1993; Hamzeh 2004: 112-135; Salloukh and 
                                                          
3“Interview with Hizbullah Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah”, Al-Bilad Newspaper, October 12, 
1994. 
19 
 
Mikaelian 2011). In short, as Harb and Leenders put it, Hizbullah began to “reconcile its 
Islamist agenda with a form of Lebanese nationalism” in the post-Ta’if period (2005: 178-
179). Rather than following a rejectionist approach which would harm the party’s credibility, 
Hizbullah decided to have a constructivist attitude and become part of the political system, 
accepting to play the same rules of the game that it sharply condemned in past years. 
Moreover, the party followed the clientalist approach that was common in Lebanon and 
started providing services to its own sect/followers. In fact, Hizbullah wanted to be a 
decision-maker in the political life of the country and it established its own social networks 
which came to substitute for the socio-economic responsibilities of the Lebanese 
government. Clearly, the party contradicted its 1985 manifesto with these policies but 
ideological justifications were provided mirroring the changing circumstances, and time 
proved that the party chose the right path, as the following years showed that Hizbullah’s 
institutionalization in the Lebanese political system not only had a positive effect on the 
socio-economic status of the Shi‘as but also on the standing of the party itself. When 
Hizbullah issued its second manifesto in 2009, it was not the declaration of a movement of 
revolutionaries but that of a powerful and influential political party. The following section 
demonstrates this claim by studying the party’s new manifesto and comparing it to the 1985 
letter. 
2.3-The 2009 Manifesto: How it differed from the Open Letter 
On 30 November 2009, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave an almost 3-hours 
press conference whereby he announced the party’s new manifesto. This reflected almost a 
quarter of a century’s political maturity and highlighted Hizbullah’s domestic, regional, and 
international policy shifts and dynamics (Alagha 2011: 28). The manifesto symbolized the 
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political evolution of the party since the announcement of the 1985 Open Letter and defined 
its vision about the future (Berti 2010). For many, the Manifesto was clear evidence that 
Hizbullah had undergone huge transformations to become a pragmatic movement, and a 
regular Lebanese political party confined by the constraints of the confessional system (Ensor 
2009; Shapira 2009). Other scholars on the other hand interpreted the new manifesto 
differently, not seeing any substantial changes in it (Berti 2010). 
The 2009 manifesto offers the reader an overview of the party’s new vision and 
aspirations on various political, military, and socio-economic levels. Nevertheless, the 2009 
Manifesto is considered a political document above anything else, presenting the party’s 
political positions within domestic as well as international contexts. The document reflects 
the major global changes occurring during the time of the issuance of the manifesto; it 
presents the party’s stances vis-a-vis the U.S. hegemon and its allies; more importantly, it 
stresses Hizbullah’s Lebanese character and defines the party’s vision of a strong Lebanese 
state and the ties that this state shall have with its neighboring Arab and Islamic nations. 
Nasrallah explains the purpose and the timing of the new Manifesto. The first 
headline, “Domination and Hegemony” is a condemnation of the U.S. and its allies, as well 
as a denunciation of world globalization and U.S. policies in the Middle East (Hizbullah 
2009). The second part makes the point that Lebanon is Hizbullah’s homeland and that the 
party wants Lebanon “for all Lebanese alike” and wants it strong as well as unified (Kfoury 
2010). The manifesto stresses the importance of resistance, defining it as a national necessity 
to counteract the danger of Israel. Furthermore, although Hizbullah still views sectarianism 
as a constraint to achieve genuine democracy, the party regards it as a transitional step and a 
helpful tool to achieve democracy in the future. The Manifesto also introduces the notion of a 
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“strong, capable, and just Lebanese state”, one where sovereignty, national unity and 
citizens’ rights are absolute. When defining the relations of this strong Lebanese state with its 
neighbors, the 2009 manifesto highlights the constructive role of Syria and the significance 
of building good ties with Iran. Finally, it ends by condemning Israel and rejecting any 
compromise or recognition with it (Hizbullah 2009). 
It is true that unlike the 1985 Open Letter which was strictly an ideological document, 
the 2009 Manifesto reflected Hizbullah’s political and intellectual visions, addressing a wide 
range of issues such as resistance, administration, reforms, socio-economy, and of course, 
politics. This is because the manifesto was the outcome of a quarter century’s political and 
socioeconomic progress. In 1985, the party was a military movement, mobilizing all its 
resources towards fighting Zionism and Israel (Alagha 2011: 29). In 2009 the dynamics had 
changed. Hizbullah was not only a full-fledged party, but had become a fundamental pillar of 
the political system of Lebanon. Moreover, it had earned recognition and credibility 
domestically but also in the Arab and Islamic worlds, especially after the 2000 Israeli 
withdrawal and the July 2006 war. As Salloukh and Mikaelian state, the Open Letter was 
written within Khomeini’s oppressor versus oppressed equation, targeting only the militancy 
outlook of the movement; the 2009 Manifesto on the other hand, was much stretched, 
bringing to light the party’s positions reflecting the developments in Lebanon, in the region, 
and worldwide in a milder tone (2011). 
The literature evaluating and comparing both the Open Letter and the 2009 Manifesto 
is vast. Both documents constitute the two formal manifestos of Hizbullah since its 
establishment. There are those who interpret the 2009 Manifesto as a new phase in the 
party’s history (Kabbara 2009), and sometimes even go further to claim that the second 
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manifesto has replaced the Open Letter (Kfoury 2010) and has abandoned Hizbullah’s core 
Shi‘a Islamic identity. On the other hand, the contrary opinion stresses that Hizbullah’s goals 
have remained unchanged since its establishment until present times (Spyer 2009). The 
former highlights the party’s integration in the country’s political system, whereas the latter 
refers to Hizbullah’s calls for Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism and their continued 
condemnation of U.S. and Israel. What these two groups fail to mention is that the older 
document is purely ideological, written by military jihadis, whereas the recent one is a 
political document presented by a confident and strong political party. Although it is correct 
to claim that some ideological factors did not change between the 1985 and 2009 manifestos, 
this does not mean that major changes were not present. In fact, some remarkable shifts and 
moderated stances in the recent document are noticeable. In 2009, one could notice a political 
evolution that could also be interpreted as an ideological flexibility. True, Hizbullah kept 
some of its founding principles unchanged, but it undoubtedly became more pragmatic. 
In general, Hizbullah’s worldview did not undergo a drastic change. Khomeini’s 
concepts of oppressors versus oppressed were re-emphasized in the 2009 Manifesto. The 
party’s foreign policy did not change much either except for the new positive approach 
towards the European Union. Hizbullah continued its condemnation of the United States and 
Israel, only in 2009 the party distinguished between Israelis and Jews (during the pre-Ta’if 
era, all Jews were equated to Israelis and regarded as enemies), and again, any type of 
negotiation or compromise with Israel was rejected. Another major issue that did not change 
is the call for the unity of Arabs as well as Muslims against universal challenges against 
them. Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism have remained in the agenda of Hizbullah unchanged 
(Hizbullah 2009). 
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On the other hand, in 2009 Hizbullah openly acknowledged its regional allies and 
unlike the 1985 Open Letter, it did not refer to a strategic partnership with Iran. Moreover, as 
much as the establishment of an Islamic republic had primacy in the Open Letter, it was 
never mentioned in the new manifesto. Instead, Hizbullah recognized the territorial integrity 
and the sovereignty of Lebanon, presenting itself as a patriotic faction in Lebanon, and 
accepting the cultural and sectarian diversity present in the Lebanese society (Kfoury 2010). 
Once a movement that rejected the existing state of Lebanon and refused to have any ties 
with the Christian citizens, in the 2009 Manifesto Hizbullah was clearly calling for the 
collaboration of all Lebanese, in building “a strong and capable state” of Lebanon together. 
The movement that once had rejected the multi-sectarian political system and refused to be 
part of it now demonstrated high competence in operating within this same system. 
Hizbullah officials suggest that the Open Letter was strictly ideological whereas the 
recent Manifesto does not have a similar nature. Abdel Halim Fadlallah, economist and 
director general of Hizbullah’s Consultative Center for Research and Documentation, argues 
that the Open Letter is purely doctrinal, representing the philosophy of the party during its 
formative stage. It demonstrates the ideology and the thoughts of the movement during a 
time when Lebanon was occupied, and hence shows the objective of Hizbullah as strictly 
restricted to fighting Israel. On the other hand, Fadlallah classifies the 2009 Manifesto as a 
political document revealing the standpoints of the party with respect to the developments 
that are taking place domestically and worldwide.
4
 Fadlallah reasons that it is the non-
ideological nature of the 2009 manifesto which makes the rigid stances of the party absent in 
the recent document. Minister of State for Administrative Reforms Mohammed Fneish also 
                                                          
4
 Abdel Halim Fadlallah, economist and director general of the Consultative Center for Research and 
Documentation, interview by author, Beirut, 21 April 2011. 
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shares this same view. He argues that the 1985 Letter and the 2009 Manifesto are not 
contradictory at all. The former represents pure doctrinal thought in the midst of Israeli 
occupation and during the absence of the Lebanese state, while the latter comes to reveal the 
views of the party 25 years after its founding.
5
 
Away from the contextual comparison, the 2009 manifesto contained little Islamic 
and religious terminologies (Ali 2009). In addition, it utilized concepts and themes which 
demonstrate a high degree of political sophistication and a better understanding of 
international politics. In 1985 Hizbullah was not in a position to examine strategies and 
relations, and understand foreign policies, whereas in 2009 it had become an influential 
player in the political arena of Lebanon, securing a strong and solid standing (Berti 2010). 
Moreover, it had become a deterrence force against Israel (al-Zayn 2009; Salloukh and 
Mikaelian 2011). At the dawn of the 21
st
 century the Open Letter was too ‘foreign’ and too 
Iranian (Shapira 2009); it could not reflect the evolution in Hizbullah’s discourse nor its 
strength. Yet the new Manifesto did not come to replace the Open Letter. The old document 
is still – at least formally – considered the ideological and foundational document of the party 
whereas the 2009 manifesto reflects the party’s adaptation to the political developments that 
occurred since the party was established. In 2009, the party had developed its own social and 
economic thoughts, and likewise it was too powerful and integrated politically, economically, 
and socially to be represented by the Open Letter. The following section will examine into 
Hizbullah’s socio-economic viewpoints to assemble the socio-economic thought of the party. 
                                                          
5
 Mohammed Fneish, member of Hizbullah politburo and Minister of State for Administrative Reforms, 
interview by author, Beirut, 3 September 2011. 
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2.4-The Socio-Economic Thought of Hizbullah vis-à-vis the Lebanese State 
The 2009 Manifesto dedicated a whole section on Lebanon. In this section the party 
recognized Lebanon as its homeland, defined the characteristics of the Lebanese state that it 
desires, and identified the ties that this state will have with neighboring Arab and Islamic 
states, as well as in the international arena. But most remarkable of all were the 
characteristics of the Lebanese state that Hizbullah claims that it wants to build, of course 
with the collaboration and participation of other remaining Lebanese citizens (Hizbullah 
2009).  
Hizbullah alleges that its goal is to establish a Lebanese state capable of protecting 
the country and the people of Lebanon, a state that is equipped with a strong army; one that 
has modern and effective institutions, where public sector recruitments are based on 
qualifications and skills. A state that works to bridge socio-economic gaps; one which takes 
care of its citizens, works to provide them with adequate services of education and medical 
care, and secures decent living conditions to them. Finally, a state that pays attention to its 
younger generation and gives high importance to providing educational services (Hizbullah 
2009).  
Even in their electoral programs since 1992 – the first elections in which Hizbullah 
participated – the party called for a strong state capable of undertaking reforms on the 
political, administrative, economic, social, and educational levels. From the very beginning, 
Hizbullah called upon the Lebanese government to develop the country’s infrastructure in all 
developmental spheres. It also asked the government to provide health and social services 
and establish public medical centers and hospitals. Moreover, and as part of their mission, 
Hizbullah showed a willingness to work with the Lebanese state in building capacities to 
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defend the Lebanese and produce what they believe to be “a resistance society” at all levels 
(Alagha 2011: 65-93).  
Also in the next elections, Hizbullah called for the enhancement of the public sector 
and asked the state to show responsibility towards its citizens. Again, it acknowledged the 
need to develop social welfare institutions, increase social benefits, and support all types of 
social care organizations. Finally in the 2009 elections, Hizbullah’s program emphasized the 
initiation of economic reforms as well as the new and increased role of the state, far from 
only being a partial contributor to the economic and social well-being of the state and 
describing it as “responsible for achieving development and justice” (Alagha 2011: 93). 
However, Hizbullah’s quest to establish a strong and capable state raises questions 
about the extent of sincerity of the party. Establishing a strong and capable state would mean 
that this state will provide services to all its citizens and hence political parties will not need 
to fill any gaps by providing benefits to their own sects. Will ideology be enough for 
Hizbullah to enhance its popularity if this happens? No one can deny the importance of social 
services in gaining political loyalty. Moreover, the neoliberal practices of Hizbullah in the 
social sphere hinder the advancement of this state because people’s allegiances are to the 
party more than to the state. Therefore, even if Hizbullah emphasizes its desire to have a 
strong and capable state of Lebanon, in practice the party is not allowing the advancement of 
its state, well knowing that its profound existence will be affected if not threatened. 
Even Hizbullah’s municipal elections’ programs aimed at enhancing developmental 
needs, undertaking reforms, attaining efficiency at administrative levels, and achieving 
social, health, educational, and economic welfare through developmental projects. Of course 
these developmental projects were put forward to consolidate the resistance society and were 
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to be financed by the state and hence realized through it. This was regarded as a very 
constructive step by Hizbullah: being able to have an integrative role within the Lebanese 
polity and participate in the state’s decision-making process and at the same time boosting 
and maintaining its popularity within the Shi‘a community in Lebanon. This also confirmed 
how Hizbullah broadened the concept of resistance to become not only military but also 
political and social in order to make the Shi‘as of Lebanon responsible, righteous, and self-
conscious citizens (Harb and Leenders: 2005). This is Abdel Halim Fadlallah’s point. From 
the time of its integration into the Lebanese polity, the party has called upon the Lebanese 
government to fulfill its socio-economic responsibilities towards the Shi‘a community. 
Hizbullah linked this to the concept of disempowerment (mustad‘afeen) and made it its 
objective as the representative of a quite large segment of the Lebanese Shi‘as. The party 
wanted to make sure that its community will have all its socio-economic, cultural, and 
political needs satisfied to be able to resist and struggle (Fadlallah 2009). 
Hizbullah officials do not miss an opportunity to claim that it is for the benefit of the 
party to have a strong state in Lebanon that will guarantee social justice and achieve political 
and social reforms. In the end, the party considers one of its main duties the safeguarding of 
the needs of its resistance society. Hence, when Hizbullah recognizes the Lebanese state, this 
means it expects that the state realizes the social and economic needs of those who give 
sacrifices to achieve liberty for this state (Fadlallah 2009). According to Hizbullah officials, 
then, the strength and the capability of the state are not defined only by the criteria of 
sovereignty and independence; in addition to the political, there is also the socio-economic 
component. The state has to pay attention in putting forward balanced social and economic 
policies that will result in stability and independence. 
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Driven by their ideology and thought and as part of their theoretical calls for reforms 
through the state, Hizbullah has opposed privatization policies and neoliberal initiatives since 
its participation in the political life of Lebanon. This economic aspect was part of the reason 
why the party opposed most governments after the Ta’if agreement and did not grant them a 
vote of confidence. The economic vision of the post-Ta’if Lebanese governments was based 
on loans and privatization, an approach that Hizbullah opposed. This, along with the 
opposition of the early Rafic Hariri governments to the resistance philosophy, was enough to 
make Hizbullah the opposition. But even when the Lebanese government recognized its 
resistance and supported it during President Emile Lahoud’s era (1998-2007), it was the 
economic privatization strategy of the government that obstructed Hizbullah’s participation 
in the government. This was clearly revealed in the 2000 elections. Hizbullah rejected the 
government’s monetary and economic policies that were based on non-productive sectors 
and on encouraging privatization (Fadlallah 2009). Moreover, Hizbullah distrusted 
international organizations, considering them agents of the 21
st
 century’s globalization led by 
the United States to the benefit of the West. 
Even though Hizbullah’s opposition did not lead to any change in the latter’s policies, 
Fadlallah proclaims that the party succeeded in restraining some neoliberal projects as well 
as slowing down privatization initiatives (Fadlallah 2009). But is this what Hizbullah applied 
in practice? The following section will demonstrate how the party established its own vast 
networks and institutions and encouraged all types of private initiatives. It will unpack the de 
facto policies of Hizbullah on the ground, showing how the party acted in a neoliberal way to 
advance its community, yet at the same time to strengthen its own power and credibility. 
Moreover, the neoliberal policies came at the expense of the strength of the Lebanese state. 
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As Hizbullah grew stronger, the Lebanese state became weaker especially in the eyes of 
party followers. Therefore, Hizbullah’s practices did not pave the road for establishing a 
‘strong and capable state’; on the contrary, they undermined its credibility and authority. 
2.5-The Socio-Economic Policies of Hizbullah in Practice 
 The post-Ta’if era marked not only the end of Hizbullah’s militant phase, but also the 
consolidation of the party’s institutional structure that targeted the Shi‘a communities in the 
Bekaa, the South, and in the Beirut suburbs where Shi‘as are mainly concentrated (Hamzeh 
2004: 44-79; Harik 2004: 81-94; Salloukh and Mikaelian 2009). Hizbullah showed high 
commitment in delivering social and humanitarian services through non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), civil institutions, infrastructure networks, and numerous welfare 
programs (Alagha 2006: 165-167). The party was transformed from being just a military 
organization to a social service provider and started operating schools, agricultural services, 
and hospitals. These vast networks, institutions, and programs eventually led to better socio-
economic conditions of the poor Shi‘as, ended their disadvantaged stereotype, and gave them 
a sense of identity. Of course, Hizbullah did not intend merely elevating the Shi‘a status by 
establishing social service organizations; the party wanted to establish a resistance society 
and provide all its needs to keep this society committed and effective. Certainly this in turn 
would lead to boosting Hizbullah’s image and the popularity, and will grant it control over a 
substantial faction of the Lebanese Shi‘as. Additionally, the party aimed in presenting these 
social programs as the collaborative result between resistance identity on one hand and 
cultural and socio-economic work on the other, and was successful (Alagha 2006: 168). 
 Hizbullah fostered the development of socio-economic programs and organizations. It 
is worth noting however that not all Shi‘a social institutions were created by the party. Shi‘a 
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social institutions owe their existence to the famous religious leader Mohammed Hussein 
Fadlallah who stressed the necessity of creating “dawlat al-insan” (human state) which 
would provide the Shi‘a community with humanitarian aid and necessary resources. Thus, it 
was at that time that social and service associations were created, some of them linked to 
Fadlallah himself, others to other religious figures. These institutions were private (Norton 
2007: 107-110). When Imam Sadr came to Lebanon, he decided to put an end to Shi‘a 
marginalization. Sadr established foundations and schools to strengthen the Shi‘as and make 
them have a deeper communal identity and a sense of belonging. Finally, when Hizbullah 
was formed, the party realized the success of such social institutions and their double use to: 
help and support the Shi‘a community and at the same time increase the popularity of the 
party and bond supporters to it. 
 Moreover, the poor status of Shi‘as, their formation of poverty belts in the southern 
suburbs of Beirut, and the inability of the Lebanese state to provide basic services were 
factors that encouraged Hizbullah to undertake a vast socio-economic institution building. 
Therefore, Hizbullah took the step to fill this gap and established various social, health, 
charity and educational institutions. Needless to say, this move became one of the key factors 
in expanding the party’s influence within the Shi‘a community (Azani 2009: 71). It is 
important to mention that linking social services to a specific group or party in Lebanon is 
not specific to Hizbullah. In fact, this is another feature of the sectarian system of the 
country, and Hizbullah only followed the practice of what other sects were doing. Both, 
Fneish
6
 and MP Fayyad
7
 confirm this. However what differed in the case of Hizbullah is the 
access to funding, and the efficiency of the party.  
                                                          
6
 Ali Fayyad, Member of the loyalty to the resistance parliamentary block in the Lebanese parliament, interview 
by author, Beirut, 2 August 2011. 
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Indeed, Hizbullah is said to be financed heavily through huge funds that are received 
by the party either in the forms of donations, especially from immigrants living in Africa and 
Europe, or from state-sponsors (mainly Iran) (Bruno 2011). Moreover, the party runs 
legitimate business enterprises (sometimes is also accused of having illegitimate ones) and 
maintains front companies in several African states all of which provide the party with 
enough money to finance its various institutions (Levitt 2005). Equally important is the 
efficiency and the competence manner of providing services to its adherents. Hizbullah 
watchers tie the success of Hizbullah to the party’s professionalism, effectiveness, and 
leadership (Harb 2007). Harb underlines that part of the success also stems from the party’s 
clear knowledge about the needs of its community and from its encouragement of local 
participation (of its activists) and the decentralized nature of work within these organizations 
(2007).  Finally, the all-encompassing holistic nature of the services provided by Hizbullah 
also contributes to the success of Hizbullah in the advancement of its social services network 
(Fawaz 2000; Harb 2007).  
 Some scholars see Hizbullah’s socio-economic strategies as mere acts to enhance its 
popularity and to ensure the party’s survival and credibility among the Shi‘as of Lebanon in 
general, and in the eyes of the party’s followers in particular. For them the party creates a 
dependency relation with its followers through its social services to guarantee their constant 
support. On the other hand, proponents of the party claim that the motive behind Hizbullah’s 
vast developmental programs is to satisfy the needs of what they call the “resistance society”. 
They assert that resistance is a mission and a mode of life but it cannot be present if the basic 
needs of the people who are resisting injustice and occupation are not fulfilled. Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7
 Mohammed Fneish, member of Hizbullah politburo and Minister of State for Administrative Reforms, 
interview by author,  Beirut, 3 September 2011. 
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party feels that it is its own duty to provide all the needs of the families who lost members in 
the name of Hizbullah. Still, there are scholars like Eitan Azani who claim that the intensive 
social activities of Hizbullah aim to recruit activists for the party (2009: 71).  
 It is worth noting here that Amal Movement also provides services to a faction of the 
Shi‘as. Moreover, Amal had the advantage over Hizbullah during the mid-1980s till 1990s 
because it was able to secure budgets from the government, as well as public sector benefits 
thanks to its leader Nabih Berri who later became the Lebanese speaker parliament (Norton 
2007: 111). During that period, Amal was in control of Zahrani port, sharing profits with the 
Lebanese government. Moreover, clans belonging to Amal movement emerged and occupied 
important positions in the political and economic system of Lebanon (Traboulsi 2007: 231-
232). Nonetheless, this approach of Amal Movement is more of a classical patron-client 
route, generated through state institutions. Hizbullah had to compete with Amal to enhance 
its image but had to develop institutions and put more efforts and resources on private 
initiatives due to the advantages of Amal in the public field. This resulted in Hizbullah’s 
indifference of state institutions and public sector, and led to better private institutions, 
confirming the neoliberal nature of the practices of Hizbullah.  
 In early 2006, the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
stated that “Hizbullah not only has armed and political wings – it also boasts an extensive 
social developmental program. Hizbullah currently operates at least four hospitals, twelve 
clinics, twelve schools, and two agricultural centers… It also has an environmental 
department and an extensive social assistance program” (IRIN News, 2006). Indeed, today 
the party functions as a multi-faceted organization under which various social and welfare 
institutions are run. However, giving in to the common perception that the social aspect of 
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the party is only to create support to its resistance ideology (Harik 2004) is not accurate. 
Hizbullah does not need mere votes or followers (Abild 2007); it aims to have the ability to 
control an important section of the Lebanese Shi‘as and go beyond ideology and establish a 
resistance society that is ready to fight for the causes that the party sets.  
2.6-Conclusion 
 This chapter examined how Hizbullah has shifted from being a mere military 
movement with the sole aims of fighting Israel and establishing an Islamic regime in 
Lebanon to become an institutionalized political party, with strong support and popularity 
within the Shi‘a community. Indeed, the party shifted from calling for an Islamic state to 
acknowledging the multi-sectarian state of Lebanon. However, Hizbullah’s state is supposed 
to be strong and sovereign, responsible for the well-being of its citizens and satisfying their 
social, political, and economic needs. In short, the state would be in control of its citizens’ 
lives, unlike what contemporary liberal thoughts call for. Yet, looking at the present status of 
Hizbullah, one can see its vast socio-economic, educational, and developmental networks and 
its enhancement of the Shi‘a private sector, which not only contributed to the rise of the 
Shi‘as but have also created a certain type of communal pride. Yet all these institutions come 
in harmony with the neoliberal school of thought and not the ideas of state interventionist 
thought that Hizbullah calls for. 
 No one doubts the efficiency and effectiveness of Hizbullah’s organizations. 
However, looking at the nature of these organizations, their decentralized make-up, and their 
mode of work, they fit the neoliberal organizational structure where private initiatives are 
encouraged rather than state intervention. This clearly contradicts and conflicts with 
Hizbullah socio-economic thought. The party who, in theory, condemns privatization and 
34 
 
calls for all types of developmental reforms through the state, which in turn would make the 
state stronger and its image credible, has in fact established its own networks of socio-
economic institutions and encouraged private initiatives without seeking their pursuit through 
the state. The two chapters that follow will discuss the socio-economic and educational 
services of Hizbullah: how the party’s vast institutions operate and what are their effects on 
the Shi‘a community. The next chapter will examine Hizbullah’s social institutions to denote 
the effectiveness of these institutions but at the same time unravel the neoliberal practices of 
the party. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOCIAL SERVICES: THE TOOL TO CONSOLIDATE 
POWER 
3.1-Introduction 
 Most Lebanese political parties are the result of patronage relationships being built 
along ethnic or religious lines (Sensenig-Dabbous 2009). The term political patronage is 
defined as the granting of rewards or favours such as contracts, public affairs, subsidies, jobs, 
or similar benefits in return of vote, money, or labor from the client’s part (Lemieux 1987). 
Political parties make use of patronage in order to build political machines and maintain 
advantage over rivals. Of course the efficiency of patronage decreases when the state 
provides all services to its population; likewise, as the state becomes weak, patronage 
intensifies. 
Given the fact that the Lebanese state has lagged behind in fulfilling its duties 
towards its citizens, political parties have intervened to fill the consequent gap. In fact, social 
and health services have been given attention in the political life of the country mostly as an 
instrument for patronage. Some parties/movements, such as the Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP) and Amal, have succeeded throughout the years in making use of state resources in 
order to selectively provide the needs of their followers and hence gain their loyalty. It is not 
a secret that the leaders of the aforementioned parties, Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri 
respectively, have made use of government resources, but mainly those of the Ministry of 
Displaced, and the Council of the South, only to supply their clients with various social 
services (Picard 2002).   
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 Much like other parties, Hizbullah has sought to provide its followers with benefits 
and services. However, unlike them, Hizbullah’s method cannot be described as a classical 
patron-client relationship. The party has not been part of any public institution until the 1992 
parliamentary elections, and this has been a major factor behind Hizbullah’s establishment of 
its own institutions and organizations. Moreover, the party’s goal has not been limited to 
gaining votes in elections nor at working towards gaining power in the public field. 
Hizbullah aims at consolidating a resistance culture and identity among its supporters, and 
hence enhance its reputation through this resistance identity. This is far instrumental than the 
effects of any electoral gains for the party. In fact, electoral gain can be the resulting 
consequence of Hizbullah’s success in consolidating its resistance culture and identity, and 
this is exactly how the party works. Parallel to its ‘opening-up’ phase after Ta’if, Hizbullah 
worked on cementing its relationship with its followers. It developed a “complex corporatist 
institutional structure” penetrating Shi‘a dominant areas in Beqa‘, in South Lebanon, and in 
the southern suburb of Beirut” (Salloukh and Mikaelian 2011). The party established 
multifaceted social networks to provide support and services mainly to Shi‘as, as such 
transforming the party to an agent of control and recruitment to keep followers mobilized and 
conscious of their resistance identity. 
 This chapter looks at Hizbullah as a social service provider. It shows the 
overwhelming success of the party in developing institutions of neo-liberal nature that have 
enormous positive effect on the lives of the Lebanese Shi‘as despite their contradiction with 
the party’s state-interventionist thought. The chapter’s main focus is on the importance of the 
social services in consolidating Hizbullah’s power in Lebanon in general and among the 
party’s community in particular. After discussing the importance and benefits of social 
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services, the chapter then categorizes Hizbullah’s various social services into three 
subgroups: (1) reconstruction, (2) health and (3) charity, and discusses the functions of the 
major organizations in each subgroup, referring to their mode of action purpose of 
establishment, and the benefits they bring to the Shi‘as affiliated with the party. The chapter 
concludes by highlighting the double benefits of the social service sector of Hizbullah: 
serving the poor Shi‘as on one hand, and gaining their loyalties, support, as well as recruiting 
them into the party’s ‘resistance society’ on the other hand. The party, whose social and 
economic thought advocated state-interventionism, has been acting as the most liberal in its 
institutional practices.  
3.2-Social Services: The Key to Domination 
 Although scholars and policy makers (especially Westerners) have usually identified 
Hizbullah negatively, reaching to even labeling the party as a terrorist organization (Stern 
2003; Azani 2009: 201), at present Hizbullah has become one of the mostly institutionalized 
parties in Lebanon with powerful military, political, security, and social bases that have 
enabled the party to win the loyalty and support of a considerable section of the Shi‘a 
community (Harik 2004; Salloukh and Mikaelian 2011). Moreover, and in addition to its 
military and resistance successes, the party has used a social-service model to advance its 
political and ideological goals. It has accomplished this by securing a solid popular support. 
By providing the needs, advancing developmental goals and fighting against injustices that 
Shi‘as face in Lebanon, Hizbullah has grown influential and gained substantial control over a 
large segment of the Lebanese Shi‘as. Of course the historical failure of the Lebanese 
governments to fulfill the needs of the Shi‘as has only intensified the service-oriented nature 
of Hizbullah, elevating the party to become an almost shadow state, boosting its image even 
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more, while weakening that of the Lebanese state. In fact, the party has constructed its model 
having political, military and social branches to be able to compensate for all the needs of the 
historically disadvantaged Shi‘as. Moreover, the party has used the strategy of mobilizing 
people through the concept of the resistance ideology; this has clearly accelerated Shi‘a 
mobilization and made their support for the party even firmer and more effervescent. 
 Hizbullah designed its social power in a way that enables it to influence all the 
aspects of its Shi‘a followers. Some analysts claim that during the years that followed the 
July 2006 war, the party allocated up to 50 percent of its budget to social service effort (Love 
2010). Certainly, the party describes the intent of its social services as a party duty and an 
inherent part of Islam as well. Hizbullah deputy secretary general Na‘im Qassem asserts that 
the party works hard in order not to neglect any aspect of the needs of the disadvantaged. He 
further explains how the party has performed to its maximum capabilities throughout the 
years to respond to the social needs of the poor (Qassem 2005: 284). Whether under the label 
of “party duty” or resistance identity, it seems that Hizbullah has identified and aggressively 
organized its social service wing, being more successful than other political parties and even 
the Lebanese state. Moreover, the party has not only been well-organized and effective but 
has also dealt with the social service sector comprehensively, tackling all its aspects.  
 Hizbullah has become the premier provider of the needy Shi‘as who had been long 
since marginalized. Furthermore, the party’s social network infrastructure relies on human 
capital and technological and organizational skills to tackle the needs of its community 
effectively (Cammett 2006). It is not an exaggeration to say that Hizbullah has taken care of 
every deficiency and every need among its followers (Love 2010). Therefore, and in short, 
Hizbullah’s social organizations have been more prominent than others because of their 
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efficiency and the specific constituency that they serve. And this mode of action along with 
its intensity has given the party a strong political role within the Shi‘a society and has 
transformed it into one of the most influential players in the Lebanese political system.  
 Hizbullah’s social services have undoubtedly served the basic needs of the deprived 
and the disadvantaged Shi‘as, and made vital differences in their lives, sometimes its benefits 
being extended to non-Shi‘a Muslims and Christians as well (Hamzeh 2004: 113). It was 
Hizbullah who helped Christians of Hark Hreik rebuild their homes after they came back 
when the civil war had ended (Cammett 2006). Hizbullah officials stress that the purpose 
behind the party’s NGOs and its social and welfare programs is to make the government take 
constructive measures that aim to develop not only the center (Beirut and Mount Lebanon), 
but also the peripheries (Harik 2004: 85). Nonetheless, the party’s popularity was not only 
enhanced because it was able to meet many of its community’s acute needs and perform the 
duties of a state; Hizbullah’s popularity increased because the party succeeded in adopting 
the rhetoric that confirms with the Shi‘a yearning for social justice (Fadlallah 2007; Abdel-
Samad and Flanigan 2011). Moreover, Hizbullah set its social programs as ideals of social 
justice and addressed them as being the association between resistance identity on one hand 
and cultural and socio-economic work on the other (Alagha 2006: 168). In other words, 
Hizbullah was successful in recognizing the Shi‘a longing for social justice, and centered its 
NGO networks and social programs towards these ideals, of course under the context of 
resistance. 
In its early formative years, the party’s initial goal was to fight and put an end to the 
Israeli occupation. However, with the beginning of the 1990s, Hizbullah started playing a 
much broader role in Lebanon, integrating itself into the political life of the country and 
40 
 
widening its scope to include political, social, and educational aspects aside from its military 
and security facets. After eight years of preaching military jihad, resistance became social 
and political as well. It became a mission and a choice of life, and as such, it went beyond 
combat and included social and political jihad as well (Harb and Leenders 2005). According 
to this new formula, health and social services paralleled armed resistance. Mobilized by the 
ideology of the resistance society, Hizbullah followers trusted that the party will meet the 
needs of their families as well as support them in case they die while fighting for Hizbullah. 
 Post-Ta’if Hizbullah was able to gain the trust and the confidence of the Shi‘a 
community because the latter always believed that the party does not use government 
institutions for patronage purposes (Love 2010). Instead the party provides services and aid 
distributed broadly to mainly needy populations. Hence, it is the socio-economic services of 
Hizbullah that play the key role in enhancing its resistance society and keeping it mobilized. 
These services have given the party a solid constituency and granted it the support of the 
Shi‘a community, thus expanding its control and leading to substantial electoral victories. 
Another notable factor with regard to Hizbullah’s popularity which resulting from the 
party’s strategic planning is Hizbullah’s support base. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
the party did not follow classical patron-client relationships, but distributed its services 
broadly. Moreover, the poor or the disadvantaged are not the only ones who identify with the 
party. Hizbullah was successful in having sympathizers from different classes (Harik 1994). 
Adham Saouli divides the support base of Hizbullah into the: (1) ideologically oriented, (2) 
business oriented and (3) sympathizers (2003). The first group includes the top party 
members and their families, who support the party regardless what orientation it will take. 
Those belonging to the second group have commercial interests or profitable gains in the 
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areas that are under Hizbullah’s control. They are affiliated with the party because their 
interests are safeguarded. However, the third group is the largest group, characterized by 
those who mainly benefit from the services of Hizbullah. People belonging to this group feel 
protected by the party and admire its achievements. A survey about social and health services 
conducted in 1996 – even before the liberation of the South, a factor that increased 
Hizbullah’s popularity considerably – showed that 64% of the Shi‘a population were 
receiving Hizbullah services. Likewise, 72% of the poor indicated that Hizbullah was their 
preferred political party (Harik 1996). 
 Elections are usually defined as the means whereby people choose the representatives 
who they believe will serve them the most. In 1992 Hizbullah participated and won in the 
parliamentary elections for the first time. It was the first time in the history of Lebanon that 
an Islamic bloc entered the parliament (Hamzeh 2004: 112). The party’s inspiring ideology 
along with its welfare services had targeted many Shi‘as who gave the party their votes. This 
success persisted with every election and was even increased especially after the withdrawal 
of Israeli troops from Lebanon in 2000. Moreover, the number of votes that Hizbullah 
candidates gained also witnessed an increase with each election. (For example, in the 2000 
elections, Hizbullah candidate Mohammad Ra‘ad received 201,901 votes, the highest votes 
of the 14 seats allocated for Shi‘as in South and Nabatieh districts, while Amal candidate and 
Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament Nabih Berri received 183,450 votes) (Hamzeh 2004). 
 Municipal elections were not any different. In fact, Hizbullah’s power in Shi‘a 
dominant towns was made obvious through the party’s success in municipal elections. Again, 
Hizbullah participated in the 1998 elections which were held for the first time after a 35 year 
break (Hamzeh 2004: 122). In all its programs, the party made sure to emphasize 
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comprehensive projects and programs that had a practical and pragmatic nature, not a rigid 
ideological one. Moreover, the social services and developmental programs were the main 
themes of these elections. The party made sure to introduce candidates who would serve the 
people at the best of their capabilities (Hamzeh 2004). As in parliamentary elections, the 
party was successful in enhancing its popularity and gaining power through the votes of its 
loyal followers who granted these votes in return for the party’s services. 
 Therefore, the elections were a proof that the party had made the right decision in 
expanding its wings to include the social sphere. Whether labeled as a resistant organization 
or a terrorist one, Hizbullah has developed a huge popularity and has helped improve 
standards of living because of its social welfare programs. Moreover, the close relationship 
between the leadership and the popular base has augmented the party’s control and power on 
the ground (Hamzeh 2004: 135). Hence, during parliamentary elections the social service 
sector has been used to make Hizbullah a key political player in Lebanon. Even though the 
party has helped its community, the services that Hizbullah has offered have strengthened the 
party’s control and influence in many Shi‘a-dominant villages. By all means, the party has 
been known as the “most effective welfare provider in Lebanon, far more effective than the 
state” (Cammett 2006). 
3.3-Finances of Hizbullah: Where does Hizbullah’s Money Come From? 
 Especially after the September 11 attacks and after some states have labeled the party 
as the terrorist team A organization,
8
 Hizbullah finances have come under scrutiny. Research 
and analyses have been enormous about how Hizbullah is funded. Of course when talking 
about who finances Hizbullah, Iran is automatically assumed as the party’s state-sponsor 
                                                          
8
 "Hezbollah Says Will Defend Lebanon from US Threats," Reuters, September 6, 2002 
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(Bruno 2011). Western analysts and diplomats estimate that Hizbullah receives nearly 200 
million dollars per year from Iran (Wilson 2004). Certainly not all the amount comes as cash 
funds; in fact, a substantial part is in the form of material goods as well as in the form of 
charity. 
The second source of Hizbullah finances comes in the form of foreign remittances 
from contributors of the supporters of the party living outside Lebanon, particularly those 
Lebanese Shi‘as living in South America and Africa. In fact, MP Mohammad Ra‘ad, head of 
Hizbullah’s “Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc in the Lebanese parliament, claims that the 
main income of Hizbullah is generated through private investment and wealthy Shi‘as 
(Wilson 2004). 
 In order to keep the flow of foreign remittances and immigrant donations active, 
Hizbullah organizes fundraising activities in countries where the Shi‘a presence is 
considerable. Millions of dollars are collected and sent to Hizbullah during such activities. 
To give an example, the Union Transport Africaines Flight 141 that crashed while taking off 
from Cotonou, Benin in West Africa was said to be carrying two million dollars of 
contributions to Hizbullah all the way to Beirut (Levitt 2005). Of course, this amount, 
although substantial, is the proceeds of one of many similar fundraising events that are 
organized to support Hizbullah. The party’s charity organizations are very powerful in 
keeping party followers mobilized and always ready to support the party financially aside 
from the moral backing. 
 Another important income source for Hizbullah is its widespread networks of 
business activities whether legitimate or not. The party is known to have established major 
companies in several countries in Africa (Levitt 2005). Moreover, Hizbullah generates 
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substantial funds from exporting diamonds from various African countries such as Liberia, 
Congo, and Sierra Leone.
9
 Hizbullah is also known to be popular in trading of other goods 
such as cosmetics or frozen meet (Becker 2011). One accusation that has become popular is 
the claim that the party uses its charity organizations as a tool to hide secret activities (Love 
2010). Similarly, the party is said to be using its legitimate business companies for 
laundering or transferring large amounts of money. The most common example here is the 
West Union offices run by local Hizbullah officials (Levitt 2005). 
 When talking about the party’s illegitimate activities, the most common illegal 
businesses are: money laundry and drug smuggling (Becker 2011). The party is said to be 
involved in various criminal businesses related to these two charges across the world and 
particularly in North and South America and in Africa. The purpose is to provide money for 
the party to finance its military, social, and political programs (Greenberg 2002). 
Government bureaucrats in Chile and Venezuela have identified a number of import-export 
companies, mostly located in the free-trade zone areas that purportedly serve as shell 
companies for Hizbullah. The same have been observed by Venezuelan officials as well 
(Levitt 2005). 
 One recent exposition of the party’s illicit activities claims that it has “gained a 
deepening foothold in the cocaine business according to an assessment by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime” (Becker 2011). It also asserts that senior party officials are 
involved in the cocaine trade in various South American counties. Moreover, the article 
claims that new routes are being added like Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, 
Paraguay, to expand the illegitimate yet highly profitable businesses of the party (Ibid. 2011). 
                                                          
9
 U.S. Senator Dick Durbin Press Release, “Durbin Hearing Confirms Conflict Diamond-Terrorist Link,” 13 
February 2002, available online at durbin.senate.gov/~durbin/new2001/press/2002/02/2002213610.html.  
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 However, the scandal of the Lebanese Canadian Bank was the biggest evidence of the 
ever-expanding role of Hizbullah in drug trade according to the investigations of the 
American and Israeli intelligence. The bank was accused of serving as a haven for 
Hizbullah’s money deposits and around 200 accounts inside the bank - all worth millions - 
were identified as belonging to supporters of the party. The way things were interpreted, 
these Shi‘a businessmen who owned these accounts were involved in illegitimate businesses 
to finance the party. They were combining the drug proceeds with their legitimate business 
gains to make it sound legitimate (Becker 2011). 
Lastly, zakat
10
 is also another source through which Hizbullah generates large 
amounts of funds. As a source of income, zakat became popular especially after the fatwa of 
late Ayatollah Khomeini whereby he legitimized using zakat funds as a means for financing 
resistance movements against Israel (Love 2008). 
 It is obvious that Hizbullah operates without any revenue constraints. Although Iran 
provides the party with substantial funds, the party has been successful in its independent 
fundraising through a wide range of activities from charity to illegal businesses. These 
diversified activities guarantee the party’s independence and its attempt to continue its vast 
social service sector no matter what happens to its state sponsor. The question that remains, 
however: what will happen to Hizbullah if the United States or any international organization 
can find a way to stop all the party’s dubious funds and businesses? The next section will 
examine Hizbullah’s main organizations, grouping them as (1) reconstruction, (2) health and 
(3) charity. The below examination will demonstrate how these organizations function, 
                                                          
10
 Zakat is one of the Five Pillars of Islam, defined as the donation of a fixed quota of a person’s wealth to 
charity 
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referring to their efficiency in performance, but also to the neoliberal mode of their 
performance. 
3.4-Reconstruction, Health, and Charity: The Humanitarian side of 
Hizbullah 
 Some political scientists give credit to Hizbullah’s social services so much that they 
attribute the party’s success to its utilization of social services. These scholars go even 
further and assert that all party activities would not have been achieved without the presence 
of the social wing of Hizbullah (Love 2010). Others, such as Joseph Alagha, claim that the 
party has established its civil institutions and NGOs in order to expand its support base 
among its followers (2006: 167). But whether the aim behind this huge social network is to 
provide services to an oppressed population or to simply manipulate their support and use it 
as a shield for the activities of the party, or increase the influence and control of the party and 
make it the most influential actor both within the Shi‘a community and inside Lebanon, no 
one can deny the material benefits as well as the effectiveness that the social services of 
Hizbullah bring to the Shi‘a community in Lebanon. 
 Hizbullah’s organizations and social networks were brought to existence during the 
party’s early years. Yet, during the period before Ta’if, Hizbullah had its focus on two main 
goals: fighting Israel and liberating South Lebanon. Therefore, it was not easy to expand and 
include a social wing. At least this is what party officials stated.
11
 But whether this is genuine 
or whether during its pre-Ta’if era the party was only a military organization, it is obvious 
that the social organizations started developing deeply and expanded during the post-Ta’if 
                                                          
11
 Ali Fayyad, Member of the loyalty to the resistance parliamentary block in the Lebanese parliament, 
interview by author, Beirut, 2 August 2011, and 
Mohammed Fneish, member of Hizbullah politburo and Minister of State for Administrative Reforms, 
interview by author, Beirut, 3 September 2011. 
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era, exactly when Hizbullah was practically integrated within the Lebanese state. It was at 
this time that the party realized the benefits of investing in the social field and was 
transformed into a social provider by all means. In fact, the party established a separate entity 
for social services, placing it under the jurisdiction of its executive council, the body 
responsible for the party’s daily activities and operations in all its branches, all over Lebanon 
(Hamzeh 2004: 49). Thus, numerous organizations of diverse types were established, all 
performing autonomously. This section will mention the major ones, grouping them under 
three categories: (1) reconstruction, (2) health and (3) charity. 
 3.4.1- Reconstruction 
 The most prominent reconstruction agency, whose objectives transcend 
reconstruction and include humanitarian and developmental projects is Jihad Al-Bina’ 
Developmental Association (translated as Holy Struggle for Reconstruction, henceforth Jihad 
al-Bina’). The organization was established in 1988 by Hizbullah although many claim its 
establishment dates back to 1985, when Hizbullah went public.
12
 The organization was 
brought in from Iran (IICC 2003) and licensed by the Lebanese government in 1988. Jihad Al 
Bina’soon became one of the most important NGOs in the country (Lamb 2007).  According 
to a brochure published by the organization itself and distributed by Hizbullah in May 1998, 
the main reason behind the establishment of Jihad Al Bina’ is to initiate humanitarian, 
construction, and developmental projects to face the hardship caused by the Lebanese civil 
war.
13
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 “Shabab al-Ta‘bi’a al-Tarbawiya fi Hizbullah… Bayn Haml al-Kotob wal-Boundoukiya wal-Mikinsa” 
Asharq Alawsat July 12, 2007. 
13
 Brochure published by Jihad Al Bina’ in 1998 
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 At present, Jihad Al Bina’ stands out as the biggest NGO of Hizbullah. The 
organization’s goals vary from guaranteeing rehabilitation and reconstruction to ensuring 
sustainable growth, development, and environmental protection, especially in rural areas. The 
organization is involved in numerous projects all aiming at ensuring the well-being of the 
disadvantaged and the deprived.
14
 Quilty and Ohrstrom claim that the establishment of Jihad 
Al Bina’ was Hizbullah's reaction to other local political parties’ NGO wings (2007). Aside 
from reconstruction, the services of Jihad Al Bina’ vary from providing electricity to building 
schools, mosques, hospitals, as well as collecting garbage. The organization’s achievements 
in the developmental and agricultural fields are as notable and efficient as in reconstruction. 
Jihad Al Bina’ has instigated developmental and agricultural projects collaborating with 
Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), particularly after the year 2000 – the year that Israel withdrew from South 
Lebanon except Shab‘a farms.15  
 Jihad Al Bina’ has completed around 11,000 projects from 1988 until 2002. These 
projects involved construction of homes, shops, schools, hospitals and infirmaries, churches 
and mosques (Lamb 2007). In more details, the number of homes that the Organization has 
restored during this time period exceeded 17,000 (Qassem 2005: 83). In addition, Jihad Al 
Bina’ has become the key provider of electricity and drinkable water in areas that were 
subjected to Israeli attacks. Furthermore, up until 2007, Jihad Al Bina’ assumed the 
reconstruction of dahiyeh, the southern suburb of Beirut, building up to 400 water reservoirs, 
thus securing 50 percent of the needs of the area  (Lamb 2007).    
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 “Jihad Al Bina’ fi ‘Idiha al-‘Ashreen: Muhimma Tanmawiya ila Janeb A‘mal al-Tarmeem”. Al-Safir, June 17, 
2008. 
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However, it was Jihad Al Bina’’s preparedness and speed to initiate work in Summer 
2006 that attracted all the attention. Only three hours after the ceasefire in July 2006 War - 
that lasted 33 days and during which most of the infrastructure in Lebanon’s Shi’a-dominant 
areas was damaged - Jihad Al Bina’ dispatched its engineers and began assessing the damage 
resulting from the war. The number of the engineers surpassed 1,000 in the months that 
followed the July War. The average number of engineers working at the organization during 
regular peaceful times is around 100 (Quilty and Ohrstrom 2007). 
Quilty and Ohrstrom claim that Jihad Al Bina’ has generated the most accurate 
assessment of damage resulting from the War. Initial estimates assert that 15,000 homes in 
South Lebanon and Dahiyeh were completely leveled and additional 70,000 were seriously 
damaged (Quninly and Ohrstrom 2007). As a first step toward reconstruction, Jihad Al Bina’ 
offered 12,000 US$ in cash for all those who lost their homes in Beirut and 10,000 US$ who 
lost their homes in rural areas (Blanford 2011: 413). Within few months, by November 2006, 
Hizbullah reported that the organization had distributed 300 million dollars in cash (Quilty 
and Ohrstrom 2007). Aside from construction of homes, the organization constructed and 
rehabilitated 35 schools, 100 mosques, 5 hospitals, and 8 infirmaries.
16
 Of course, the 
disbursement of the funds was done through the party and not the Lebanese government. 
This is just another confirmation of the liberal policies of the party, in contrast to state 
interventionist thought, even if the party justifies its contradictory policies by government 
incompetence and opposition. 
In an interview with Asharq al-Awsat, the director general of Jihad al-Bina’ at that 
time, Kassem Eleiq linked the preparedness of the organization to being part of the resistance 
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society. According to Eleiq, the resistance society shall always be ready to fight as well as be 
prepared for emergencies.
17
 Hence, just as the resistance society is always equipped and 
prepared for all types of emergencies, Jihad al-Bina’ shall operate similarly, as it is part of 
this resistance society. 
It is no surprise that the immediate relief acts of Jihad al-Bina’ drew the attention of 
the U.S. administration. On February 20, 2007, the U.S. government blacklisted the 
organization, with the assertion that it is funded by Tehran and controlled by Hizbullah. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for Financial Intelligence and Terrorism, 
Stuart Levey, recognized Jihad al-Bina’ as a terrorist organization, and under presidential 
orders it froze the assets of the organization in the United States (Lamb 2007). Aside from 
the U.S., at present the size and the performance of Jihad al-Bina’ is under scrutiny, given 
that reconstruction and rehabilitation are over.  
 3.4.2-Health 
The agency that encompasses all health and medical services for Hizbullah is the 
Islamic Health Unit or sometimes referred to as Islamic Health Organization (IHO). 
Originally created in 1984 in Iran, the concept of the organization was implemented in 
Lebanon to help the disadvantaged Shi‘a population. Since then, the IHO has been assigned 
the responsibility of providing medical and health care. In particular, the organization offers 
medication, distributes food, establishes clinics, and evacuated casualties (IICC 2003). Inside 
the organization, Hizbullah works hard to equip and maintain a well-trained staff and 
professional experts in all the institutions of the Islamic Health Unit to be able to fulfill the 
needs of its constituency. The party makes sure to guarantee a decent livelihood and salaries 
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to these professional staff. Needless to say, the party in return gains to loyalties as well as the 
commitment of all these experts (Harik 2004: 84). 
Hizbullah’s health care unit is estimated to provide care to over a million persons 
annually, either for free or at very reduced rates. During its early years which coincided with 
the last days of the Lebanese civil war, the organization managed to establish several health 
centers and infirmaries to cater to the medical needs of the Shi‘a dominant villages in the 
South (Qassem 2005: 84). The drastic conditions that Lebanese in general and Shi‘as in 
particular were passing through at that time made the organization indispensible. According 
to one source, IHO received during the first half of 1999 156,381 cases in its hospitals, 
dispensaries, and laboratories in various villages in Beirut, Bekaa, and the South. 
Furthermore, during these six months the organization organized around 30 health awareness 
sessions and conducted several diverse projects in partnership with the Lebanese Ministry of 
Public Health. 
18
 
After 2000, when Hizbullah liberated Southern Lebanon except for the Shab’a farms 
and Kafarshouba hills, the party was able to concentrate more on its non-military wing, and 
as a result the scope and the work of IHO was expanded as well. Statistical data shows that in 
the recent years, IHO provided free health and medical services to 88 schools. Additionally, 
it began providing continuous vaccination on regular basis to these schools as well as 
organizing disease prevention and smoking awareness campaigns (Qassem 2005: 84).  Of 
course, any political party that provides such services will secure the loyalty of the 
beneficiaries. Hizbullah justified establishing this huge health unit as a means of raising 
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social and health standards and hence guaranteeing a decent and happy life to its adherents, 
all in accordance to Islam. 
The latest studies conducted by the Organization itself show an ever growing increase 
in its services. In the latest published data for the 2011 statistics, the IHO claimed to have 1.4 
million beneficiaries.
19
 Table 3.1 summarized the various services or associations that IHO 
provides to its beneficiaries. 
        Table 3.1: Various services of IHO 
Type of service Number of beneficiaries 
Health services
20
 573,094 
Medicine 528,812 
Mental health cases 4903 
Health sessions/programs 25,894 
Public health services 77,326 
Hospitalization 208,236 
        *Data obtained from the official website of IHO
21
 
 3.4.3-Charity 
Aside from the in-kind assistance, Hizbullah distributes millions of dollars annually 
to provide support to the families of the martyrs, or to those families who have a member in 
prison or wounded severely or even missing, while carrying out “Resistance” activities or 
during the Israeli invasions on Lebanon. Here also, Hizbullah works through NGOs that fall 
under its Social Services Unit, yet have independent administration boards and operate 
autonomously, of course following a minimal “political as well as cultural orientation” 
devised by the party (Qassem 2005: 83). By establishing these charity organizations, 
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Hizbullah aims to soothe the family environment and to provide all the needs to have a 
decent and dignified life (Harb and Leenders 2005). The two institutions under this category 
that will be discussed briefly below are: The association of the Martyr (Mou’asasat Al-
Shahid) and the association of the Wounded (Mou’asasat Al-Jarha). 
The Association of the Martyr 
The Association of the Martyr, more commonly known as Al-Shahid Foundation, 
began its actions in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The association first 
started when a group of young volunteers began gathering donations and distributing them to 
those who lost their homes due to Israeli attacks. Eventually it was developed to become an 
independent organization, and was granted a license by the Lebanese government in 1989 
(Berjawi 2010).  
In the early years, the foundation’s goal was to fight the tragic social conditions that 
families who lost members during the war were facing, by providing them with financial 
assistance
22
. Today, the scope of the assistance offered by the Foundation to these families 
has widened; at present it provides comprehensive assistance at various levels that includes 
housing, health services, clothing, education, and other socioeconomic needs (Qassem 2005: 
85). At the cultural level, it provides cultural and educational programs to the families and 
children of the martyrs to help them overcome their loss. At the healthcare level, the 
Foundation grants complete medical coverage to these families. At the educational level, it 
offers scholarships to the children throughout all the educational years reaching university 
level. Finally, at the social level, it allocates a monthly salary to cover their daily expenses.
23
 
The concept behind this comprehensive support network is to free the resistance fighter from 
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any worries about his family. Indeed, any Hizbullah fighter is certain that the moment he 
dies, the party will provide all his family’s necessities, will educate his children based on the 
moto “graduating scientists from martyrs”, and even secure employment to them.24  
As of 2005, the Foundation was looking after 1284 martyrs’ families. In specific, it 
was covering the needs of 1596 parents, 1215 children, and 684 spouses (Qassem 2005, 85). 
After the July 2006 war, although Al-Shahid’s infrastructure was completely damaged, the 
organization rose from within the damage and quickly began providing all types of aid to the 
families affected by the war. Again, the Foundation aimed at restoring the stability and the 
dignity of these families to end any fears of being underprivileged (Berjawi 2010). 
Numerically speaking, the number of families receiving aid from the Foundation `at a regular 
basis rose to 2000 families after the July War, 600 of them being party officials’ families 
(Skaily 2007). In addition, the number of beneficiaries (parents, spouses and children) has 
been estimated to be 5000 after the war (Siba‘i, 2006). Finally, the annual budget of the 
Foundation has also witnessed a drastic increase after the War and is approximated to be 36 
million dollars (Skaily 2007). 
The Association of the Wounded 
Hassan Wehbi was a resistance fighter who in 1988 was severely paralyzed during an 
operation conducted against Israel. Today, he is married and has established a warm family 
with his wife and children, living in a nice apartment. He has a maid, a car, a driver at his 
disposal, his and his family’s medical services are free, and his children’s tuition is also fully 
paid. As his wife put it, even the “diapers and milk are paid for” (Haddad 2002). Hassan 
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Wehbi is only one of the several thousand wounded who receive all these services from the 
Association of the Wounded. 
Established in 1989, the aim of the foundation was to serve the needs of the people 
who were wounded or disabled by Israeli attacks. Today, it fulfills a set of fixed objectives: 
(1) Providing treatment and hospitalization to the wounded in the best possible ways, 
whether in Lebanon or abroad, (2) providing comfort, stability, and securing all the means to 
make the wounded enjoy a dignified life, (3) ensuring rehabilitation and developing their 
skills, talents, and competencies, and (4) integrating them in society for their psychological 
well-being.
25
 Moreover, it operates through several specialized subcommittees, each dealing 
with one of the following programs: health, social, cultural, educational, developmental, and 
rehabilitation. Care is never restricted to medical treatment. Furthermore, the association 
covers all the family needs of the wounded in order to free them from any financial burdens. 
In addition, the association has established rehabilitation centers to provide psychological 
support to the people and help in their reintegration in society (Qassem 2005: 84). 
As of 2003, the number of wounded regularly benefiting from the Association was 
3150. Of these, 2307 were resistance fighters, and the remaining were civilians that were 
injured either during Israeli wars or invasions on Lebanon or later due to mines planted by 
Israel in South Lebanon. Although the Association is an agency under Hizbullah’s social 
unit, its services are not restricted to Shi‘as. There are 110 Sunni and 31 Christian wounded 
citizens currently receiving monthly allowances as well as services from Association of the 
Wounded.
26
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The following table summarizes the latest statistical data provided by the Association 
in early 2012
27
 whereby it shows that the number of beneficiaries at present has increased to 
4453 wounded, categorized as follows: 
 Table 3.2: Type of injuries and number of injured 
Type of Injury/Deficiency Number of Wounded 
Spinal Cord Injury 30 
Head Injury 28 
Blindness 151 
Hand/Foot truncation 166 
Neuro-Psychological 
problems 
151 
Other 3973 
Total 4453 
 
It is worth noting that like other key Hizbullah institutions and unlike the party’s 
interventionist theoretical views, the Martyr Foundation and the Association of the Wounded 
also perform independently at the operational and financial levels (Qassem 2005: 85). Such 
an independency always ensures efficiency in work and quicker decision making because it 
avoids hierarchy and rigid bureaucracy. However, this mode of performance falls under the 
neo-liberal approach which clearly contradicts Hizbullah’s socio-economic thought. These 
associations encourage private initiative and do not seek fulfilling developmental goals 
through the state. Although their work is efficient, it is in contradiction to the party’s 
ideological thought. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
Hizbullah’s social service unit is integrated into the Lebanese society, particularly in 
areas where Shi‘as are a majority. The once disadvantaged Shi‘as today see Hizbullah’s 
services as essential to their daily lives. Being in contact with the people, sensing their needs, 
and consistently supplying their needs in an efficient manner has gained the party the loyalty 
and trust of these people. The electoral gains of Hizbullah in the parliamentary and municipal 
elections are the reflection of the success of the party’s social services. This is why 
Hizbullah’s electoral programs tend to downplay foreign policy issues and concentrate 
instead on infrastructure improvement, social services, and education (Alagha 2006: 247-
277), of course all linked to resistance ideology. The ability of the party to achieve the 
promises given during electoral campaigns regarding services and community development 
is the source of success and popularity enhancement of Hizbullah.  
When evaluating the effectiveness of Hizbullah’s social services, two-way benefits 
ought to be considered: one to the population receiving aid, and another one to the party. Just 
as the former benefits from the services of the party, the latter receives political returns (Love 
2010). It is not a secret that the work of Hizbullah is politically motivated. Even Hizbullah 
can not deny that its social services are being a recruitment tool for the party. The poor 
segment of Shi‘a society especially grant their support and allegiance to Hizbullah to benefit 
from its vast social services. Although many assert that the party takes advantage of its 
ability to provide services and transforms it into propaganda and recruitment tools (Azani 
2009: 72), these services are genuine and their flow does not stop after election campaigns. 
Moreover, the party advances its social unit alongside its resistance activities to relieve its 
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“resistance” the huge burden of assisting its population and thus be able to endure Israeli 
aggression and occupation (Qassem 2005: 86). 
Hizbullah operates through a hierarchical-pyramidal structure that aims at recruiting 
diverse segments of the Shi‘a society. Aside from the party officials and combatants, the 
party incorporates in its structure NGOs, women’s associations, and professional syndicated 
circles.
28
 This it does to become politically, religiously, and ideologically strong and to 
penetrate all the segments of the Shi‘a society. Nevertheless, the bottom level of the 
pyramidal structure constitutes the majority of poor citizens whose socio-economic needs are 
being satisfied by the social service unit of the party discussed throughout this chapter. To 
make the loyalty of these beneficiaries even stronger, Hizbullah charges its institutions and 
NGOs with norms that help produce a “resistance society” (Qassem 2002: 16). This strong 
loyalty grants the party hegemony over a considerable section of the Shi‘a society (Harb and 
Leenders 2005; Salloukh and Mikaelian 2011). The next chapter discusses the educational 
network of Hizbullah, exploring Hizbullah controlled or affiliated schools and examining 
how these schools contribute to spreading the resistance culture and consolidating Hizbullah 
power and control.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HIZBULLAH’S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: TOOLS TO 
CHANNEL MOBILIZATION 
4.1-Introduction 
 The influence of sectarianism in Lebanon has extended to reach the county’s 
educational system. Even though education in Lebanon is based on a secular scheme, it is not 
centralized, and as early as Ottoman rule, the educational system has been founded along 
confessional lines. During the era of the Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon, the discourse of 
sectarianism under Ottoman rule was pervaded in the laws of administration as well as 
education (Frayha 2004). Then came the French mandate which encouraged foreign 
missionaries to open schools in Christian dominated areas in order to educate the Christians. 
Christian sects were given autonomy to administer their own educational institutions, and 
were protected by these missionaries. Public schools were left to the poor Muslims (Al-
Habbal 2011; Kobeissy 1999). However, by the time Greater Lebanon was declared, all sects 
had formed their own schools (Al-Habbal 2011; Bahous and Nabhani 2010). Sectarianism 
was therefore stressed further in the educational system of the country and when Lebanon’s 
Constitution was promulgated in 1926, Article 10 stated: 
Education shall be free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and 
morals and does not affect the dignity of any of the religions or sects. 
There shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have 
their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the 
state regulating public instruction (The Lebanese Constitution, 1926). 
 Article 10 was not amended by the independence government of 1943, nor did 
revisions aiming at reducing the religious authorities pass successfully. On the contrary, 
sectarianism was stressed, making the educational system promote sectarian culture and 
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identities. There simply was no unified national educational policy (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008: 
55) and sects continued to establish their own schools and receive most of the students 
belonging to the same sect. The weak public infrastructure gave more room for religious 
communities to take over the educational system. Christians were the pioneers, but gradually 
other sects followed the same path. Shi‘as lagged behind. Only during the civil war there 
grew a kind of awareness among them to promote education and change their image as 
backward citizens, while at the same time producing a unique ideology (Shaery-Eisenlohr 
2008: 81). 
 As for Hizbullah, it was only in the beginning of the last decade of the 20
th
 century 
that the party launched its large-scale initiative in the education field and began establishing 
its own schools (Le Thomas 2010). Although Hizbullah’s step was seen as revolutionary, the 
party was in fact mimicking what the Catholic community had started and then Maronite, 
Sunni and other sects had followed during the 19
th
 century (Le Thomas 2010). Of course, 
aside from the party’s desire to educate the poor and marginalized Shi‘as, Hizbullah saw 
education as a tool to mobilize supporters and widen its scope of influence. Similar to its 
social networks, educational services became a tool to establish political loyalty and 
strengthen the party’s ties with the community, especially when this education came in 
coherence with the culture of resistance society and embraced it. 
 This chapter demonstrates how Hizbullah’s educational wing is part of an otherwise 
larger ensemble that makes the party a powerful player in Lebanon. It discusses Hizbullah’s 
efforts targeting the youth, looking at the party as an education provider. It first looks at the 
party as an education provider. The chapter stresses on the advantages that the party gains 
from providing educational services in a sectarian country like Lebanon. Educating the 
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members of one’s sect is a mere means to achieve political gains such as loyalty and 
popularity. The section that follows investigates thoroughly the Hizbullah schools and 
provides a comparative analysis of the different types of educational institutions that are 
either controlled and established by Hizbullah, or existed before the party and then became 
affiliated with it. Next, Hizbullah’s scout movement is examined, demonstrating its effect on 
the mobilization of pro-Hizbullah youth. The chapter ends by restating the importance of 
Hizbullah educational institutions, and the benefits that they bring to the party.  
4.2-Educational Institutions: Enhancing the status of Shi‘as or Hizbullah? 
 In addition to its social service section, Hizbullah’s educational wing is another 
essential wing of the party. Since the 1990s, education has been given a special place in the 
party’s programs and has been considered an integral part of its operations. Hizbullah spends 
14 million dollars annually on financial aid and scholarships (Hamzeh 2004: 55) in order to 
educate the Shi‘a youth and hence change the notion that they are the least educated sect in 
Lebanon. Today, Hizbullah’s educational system is recognized as very successful, educating 
thousands of underprivileged Shi‘as all over Lebanon and establishing educational 
institutions in Shi‘a dominant areas in the Southern suburbs of Beirut (dahiyeh), the South, 
and the Bekaa. 
 School is considered the forefront of a broader social-cultural movement because of 
its massive functions as well as its ability to affect generations. Especially in a sectarian 
country like Lebanon, schools can be used by sectarian political parties as platforms for 
electoral mobilization. In addition, schools are regarded as providers for local job 
opportunities, important social agents for students, and in addition “family oriented 
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institutions of public interests” (Le Thomas 2010). Therefore, and besides their social and 
educational roles, schools serve as mobilization agents at the political and social levels.  
 Aside from the inherent sectarianism of the Lebanese educational system, private 
schools are always preferred because the country’s public schools are of extremely low 
quality and only a last resort for the most underprivileged layer of the society (Abdel-Samad 
and Flanigan 2009). Most private schools, on the other hand, are very expensive. Hence, 
Hizbullah comes to provide an excellent alternative to poor public education and to the costly 
private schools. The party operates tens of schools at fees far less than most of Lebanon’s 
private schools while providing a respectful quality of education. In addition, Hizbullah 
provides the needy students with financial aid, scholarships, and books (Abdel-Samad and 
Flanigan 2009). Similar to its social services unit, the party has developed a distinct 
Educational unit to deal with educational issues and supervise the work of Hizbullah schools 
(IICC 2003). And to make the control mechanism even more competent, Hizbullah 
established the Islamic Institute for Education and Teaching (Al-Mu’assasa Al-Islamiya lil 
Tarbiya wal Ta‘leem, IIET) in 1993.  
 Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Na‘im Qassem asserts that the party 
subsidizes educational requirements for the poor Shi‘as through “educational mobilization”, 
providing educational services to thousands of students (2005: 24). As of the Summer of 
2006, the number of students benefiting from Hizbullah schools reached 14 thousand (Abdel-
Samad and Flanigan 2009). Although channeling mobilization is an important outcome 
resulting from establishing Hizbullah controlled or affiliated schools, these schools also train 
and educate the party’s future leaders. Today, it is striking how Hizbullah chief officials and 
members of Parliament are graduates of these schools, and have acquired high levels of 
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education. Moreover, Hizbullah schools are distinguished because they infuse cognitive 
principles that appeal to the Shi‘a community and are particular to it, even though the schools 
are open to all sects (Love 2010). 
 The IIET administers education from kindergarten to professional levels, and 
coordinates curricula. It also employs the staff of all schools that it oversees, and handles 
construction matters. It is concerned with the growth of the Shi‘a youth and aims at building 
a conscious and intellectual generation (Al-Sabbagh 2005). The IIET works to establish 
foundations of religious values and Islamic ethics among its adherents, as well as to 
consolidate strong human relations between its members. However, it also demonstrates 
great interest for scientific knowledge in all applied and theoretical fields.
29
 
 Hizbullah opened the first al-Mahdi school in 1993 - the same year that it founded the 
Islamic Institute for Education and Teaching - in the Nabatiyeh district (Al-Sabbagh 2005). 
The schools were named after the Shi‘a imam al-Mahdi - who according to Shi‘a ideology is 
hidden and is supposed to reappear and rescue the world - so that they educate Shi‘a 
generations in accordance with Islamic and Shi‘a values. 30  Thus al-Mahdi schools were 
opened all over Lebanon in Shi‘a dominant areas, their numbers increasing rapidly over the 
years. However, there were schools which already existed before the formation of Hizbullah 
and were later said to be linked or affiliated to the party, such as Al-Mustapha schools (Love 
2010). Al-Imdad schools as well were launched during the Lebanese civil war and were 
branches of Iranian institutions (Love 2010). All these schools will be examined and studied 
thoroughly in the next section of this chapter. 
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 The number of schools that were founded by Hizbullah as well as the number of 
scholarships being distributed, show how serious Hizbullah’s commitment is in educating its 
constituency. In addition to schools, the Educational unit of Hizbullah also provides 
specialized higher education in religion studies and applied sciences through various 
institutions, such as the Technical Institute of Sayyed Abbas Al-Moussawi, Technical 
Institute of the Great prophet, Institute of Sayyidat al-Zahra’, the Islamic Shari‘a Institute, 
and Institute of Sheikh Ragheb Harb (Hamzeh 2004: 57).  
 Therefore, Hizbullah is present in the center of its adherents’ daily lives through its 
educational institutions. The party’s involvement in education is consolidating political 
benefits to Hizbullah but it is also laying new major foundations for Shi‘a identification 
processes (Love 2010), enabling the Shi‘as to have a sense of community and become 
conscious of their own sect. The expansion of Hizbullah’s educational system is affected, and 
in turn affects, the party’s extensive cultural hegemony over the Lebanese Shi‘as. The party 
has established its schools in Shi‘a dominant areas in the South, in Beka‘a, and in the 
Southern suburb of Beirut. And aside from establishing educational institutions close to 
where Shi‘as reside, these schools bring the three Shi‘a dominant regions together on the 
social, political, and cultural levels. These schools follow homogeneous programs, 
commemorate the same events, and organize activities which bring together students from 
the various regions. The Educational unit of Hizbullah has made a big difference in the lives 
of the poor students who benefit from the nearly cost-free education in Hizbullah affiliated 
schools. The party’s allocation of educational funds has been very effective and expanded the 
party’s base, especially in a country where public schools lack funds, technology, and 
building facilities (Hamzeh 2004: 56). Hizbullah is undoubtedly effecting the Shi‘a 
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community in Lebanon and reshaping its beliefs through educational institutions. In what 
follows, a detailed description of Hizbullah-controlled or Hizbullah-connected schools will 
be given, to better understand the party’s mobilization power, but also to show how schools 
can be political tools for gaining loyalty especially in a sectarian country like Lebanon. 
4.3-Al-Mahdi, Al-Mustapha, Al-Imdad: How do they contribute to 
Hizbullah’s Mission?  
 Since its establishment, resistance has been Hizbullah’s principal goal. In the party’s 
view, the concept of resistance should be the mission of every Shi’a human being. Hizbullah 
defines resistance as the “righteous combat, supported by God, which inevitably leads to 
victory” (Harb and Leenders 2005). Nonetheless, prior to Ta’if, resistance was only military, 
aiming to fight Zionism. Later, Hizbullah broadened its scope to include political, social, and 
educational dynamics. Therefore, resistance went beyond the battlefield and became a guide 
for the transformation of the Shi’as into responsible, righteous, and self-conscious citizens. 
(Harb and Leenders 2005). In line with the resistance identity, Hizbullah’s educational 
institutions were founded to educate the party’s future generations in accordance with 
Hizbullah ideals and goals, and to support the party’s missions of fighting Israel. As such, 
Hizbullah came to establish a “resistance society” inside it schools. 
 Hizbullah spends huge resources on education and scholarships because it knows how 
its schools will constitute “building blocks” to establish the resistance society that the party 
longs for (Love 2010). Indeed, Hizbullah schools, or other Shi‘a schools connected in a way 
or another to the party, play key roles in producing and expanding the resistance society. In 
the end, all these schools preach Islamic norms and values that are in harmony with the 
party’s principles. Although the schools that belong to Hizbullah are the Al-Mahdi ones, 
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other schools like Al- Mustapha or Al-Imdad also aim at producing generations that have 
resistance as their mission and are educated according to Islamic values. Hence, this section 
will stress on Hizbullah schools, but will also shed light on the Al-Mustapha and Al-Imdad 
ones. This is done to clarify the misconception that all of the schools belong to Hizbullah, but 
also to provide a comparative analysis among the three schools and demonstrate how the 
three of them play crucial roles in the establishment of a “resistance society”. 
 It is worth noting at the outset that in comparison with other sects Lebanese Shi‘as 
experienced a delay in the establishment of their schools (Chalabi 2006; Shaery-Eisenlohr 
2008: 53), this, despite the high number of Shi‘a population in Lebanon. Therefore, and in 
order to change the image of Shi‘as and promote their ideology, the Foundation for Islamic 
Religious Education (in Arabic Jam‘iyyat al-Ta‘leem al-Dini al-Islami, henceforth JTDI) 
was established in 1974. Initially, JTDI’s aim was to provide religious education to the new 
generation (Le Thomas 2010). Therefore JTDI began to train religion teachers and publish 
religion textbooks (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008: 62), distributing them in various Lebanese public 
and private schools. However, three years after its formation, JTDI established a school to 
train religion teachers. Since then, the school gradually expanded, preparing 30 religion 
teachers annually (Le Thomas 2010). Moreover, in 1984, JTDI opened its first school named 
Al-Mustapha. As such, Al- Mustapha schools came into existence when Hizbullah was still a 
mere militant group, aiming only at fighting Zionism. 
 Aside from religion, JTDI aspires spreading Shi‘ism, a principle that Hizbullah also 
calls for. Furthermore, JTDI was headed by Sheikh Na‘im Qassem, current Deputy Secretary 
General of Hizbullah, from its creation until 1988, and he still participates in all the events of 
the Foundation as well as supervises the Al- Mustapha schools (Le Thomas 2010). On the 
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practical level, founding members of JTDI have become main figures of Hizbullah and 
helped its formation; henceforth, both JTDI and Hizbullah have received post-revolutionary 
Iranian funds and succeeded in attracting Shi‘a students to enroll in their schools rather than 
Christian missionary ones and hence spread the concept of Shi‘ism (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008: 
63, 72). Engaging in these Shi‘a schools means adhering to a certain mode of education and 
culture that emphasize the uniqueness of the Shi‘a identity. Al-Imdad schools also follow the 
Islamic doctrine and help educate the poor Shi‘as arousing in them the Shi‘a identity and 
making them conscious of this identity. What follows is a descriptive study of these schools. 
 4.3.1-Al-Mahdi Schools 
 Founded in 1993, the Al-Mahdi Schools are known as the “Hizbullah schools” within 
the Lebanese community. The schools were founded and fall under the direct supervision of 
the Islamic Institute for Education and Teaching, the body directly related to the Education 
unit of Hizbullah and responsible for students, all types of educational issues, and youth 
activities. Its main duty is to advance education in parallel to the social and service sectors of 
Hizbullah. At present, there are 14 Al-Mahdi Schools. A new school is being opened in 
Machghara, West Bekaa, and additionally, the Islamic Institute for Education and Teaching 
is currently working on opening two additional schools within the coming year, thus 
increasing the number of its schools to 17.
31
  
 The schools witnessed a significant growth in their number as well as in the number 
of students enrolled in them. The number of students exceeds 14,000 at present (Le Thomas 
2010). Each school is built in a modern way, and is equipped with new laboratories, 
computer halls, libraries, and playgrounds. The schools are distributed in Beirut, Bekaa, and 
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South governorates where Shi’a sects are mainly concentrated. The table below gives a brief 
summary about the locations of the existing Al-Mahdi Schools, student capacity, and 
languages of instruction: 
 
Table 4.1: Geographical distribution of Al-Mahdi Schools
32
:  
  School District Founded 
Max  
capacity 
From grade 
To 
Grade 
Instructed languages 
1 Qom Iran 1993 400 Kindergarten Grade 6 Arabic & English 
2 Al Sharqiya Nabatieh 1993 2500 Kindergarten Grade 3 Arabic, English, & French 
3 Al Majadel Tyre 1993 1500 Kindergarten Grade 9 Arabic, English, & French 
4 Kafarkila 
Iqlim al 
Toffah 
1994 1200 Kindergarten Grade 9 Arabic, English, & French 
5 Bazaliya Baalback 1994 1056 Kindergarten Grade 3 Arabic, English, & French 
6 Al Ghaziya Saida 1995 1000 Kindergarten Grade 9 Arabic, English, & French 
7 
Ein Al 
Mezrab 
Bent Jbeil 1995 1000 Kindergarten Grade 9 Arabic, English, & French 
8 Chemestar Baalback 1995 950 Kindergarten Grade 9 Arabic, English, & French 
9 Tyre Tyre 2000 2800 Kindergarten Grade 9 Arabic & English 
10 
An Nabi 
Shith 
Baalback 2001 750 Kindergarten Grade 9 Arabic, English, & French 
11 Bent Jbeil Bent Jbeil 2002 1560 Kindergarten Grade 9 Arabic, English, & French 
12 Shahed-Burj Beirut 2004 2400 Kindergarten Grade 3 Arabic, English, & French 
13 Baalback Baalback 2004 1740 Kindergarten Grade 3 Arabic, English, & French 
14 Al Hadath Beirut 2009 3000 Kindergarten 
Grade 
12 
Arabic, English, & French 
  
 Al-Mahdi Schools provide educational requirements matching that of Lebanese 
official school requirements, put forward by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 
but at the same time the educational system is rooted in Islamic values and dogmas (Love 
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2010). Likewise, the teachers of Al-Mahdi Schools are chosen according to skill, but also 
according to their adherence to Islamic values. Furthermore, they are committed supporters 
of Hizbullah. By 2006, the number of employees was estimated to be 800 (Le Thomas 2010). 
This number has certainly increased since then. 
 Being aware of the poor socio-economic conditions of the population strata that will 
adhere to Al-Mahdi Schools, the Islamic Institute for Education and Teaching has set low 
tuition fees in order to allow even the most disadvantaged classes benefit from their 
educational services. Furthermore, it established a special system of grants and scholarships, 
covering a substantial part of the tuition fees of those who can not afford to pay.
33
 
 In order to oversee the educational procedures and guarantee an efficient 
performance, the Islamic Institute for Education and Teaching has created several boards and 
directorates, each responsible for a specific department of task. Below is a graphical 
representation showing the various departments of the Institution
34
. Moreover, each board or 
directorate has deputy directors and sub-departments which further specialize and divide the 
work, ensuring that all aspects are covered in order to provide an Islamic oriented education 
at very little costs so as to attract a wider pool of students. 
 Figure 4.1: Graphical representation of the structure of governance of the Islamic 
Institute for Education and Teaching  
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 Beside providing education and hence altering the backward and ignorant image of 
the Shi‘as of Lebanon, the aim of the Al-Mahdi Schools is to create a resistance generation 
that is technology savvy and in tune with scientific innovations, as well as conscious of its 
Lebanese identity. Students of these schools proudly assert that at the same time that they are 
devoted fighters, they are students, technicians, and profession holders; Al-Mahdi students 
are soldiers, scientists, and civilians all at the same time (Aysawi 2007). This shows the 
success of Hizbullah in providing their young an educational environment that fits in the 
party’s resistance ideology. Hizbullah schools are clearly advancing the Shi‘a community, 
but while doing so the pool of Hizbullah adherents is increasing. The scholarships and the 
type of discipline offered at these schools mobilize the students to follow the resistance 
ideology, an objective pursued by Hizbullah.  
 4.3.2-Al-Mustapha Schools 
 As mentioned earlier, JTDI opened its first school named Al-Mustapha in 1984. Ten 
years after teaching religion and preparing religion teachers to teach in private or public 
schools, the Foundation succeeded in collecting the necessary funds to establish its own 
school (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008: 63). The objective was to make Shi‘as attend their own 
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schools rather than Christian missionary schools, but also to spread and teach Islamic values 
and experiences, especially those specific to the Shi‘a sect. The first school was located in 
Beirut, close to the JTDI, then gradually JTDI founded four additional Al-Mustapha schools 
in Shi‘a dominant areas: another one in Beirut, two schools in South Lebanon, and one in the 
Bekaa. This raised the number of Al-Mustapha schools to five. Moreover, JTDI also 
established the Al Batoul School for girls in Beirut. Table 4.2 shows some essential 
characteristics of Al-Mustapha schools: 
 
Table 4.2: Geographical distribution of Al-Mustapha schools:
35
 
  School District Founded 
# students in 
2009/10 
% students 
on  
scholarship 
Instructed languages 
1 Haret Hreik Beirut 1984 1129 37% Arabic, English, & French 
2 Tyre Tyre 1986 1332 9% Arabic, English, & French 
3 Nabatieh Nabatieh 1993 1901 36% Arabic, English, & French 
4 Ghadeer Beirut 1993 1318 39% Arabic, English, & French 
5 Kasr Naba Bekaa 1995 2031 29% Arabic, English, & French 
* 
Batoul (Bir 
Hassan) 
Beirut 1988 1118 36% Arabic, English, & French 
 
 Most of the Al-Mustapha schools are mixed (boys and girls), except for the Haret 
Hreik school. All of them have secondary classes until the Baccalaureate. The total 
enrollment of students in all Al-Mustapha schools including the Al-Batoul School is almost 
8,900. The schools are known to have outstanding students as well as achieving huge 
successes in the governmental official exams. In addition, the schools are well-equipped in 
terms of laboratories, libraries, playgrounds, and each one has a nursing clinic. Aside from 
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education, the schools organize lectures and seminars, as well as various types of activities, 
all aiming at developing the capabilities of the students and enabling them to become 
religious, moral, and conscious citizens.
36
   
 The principal of Haret Hreik Al-Mustapha School, Dr. Kassem Qallot
37
, holds a PhD 
in Sociology of Education. He confirms that Al-Mustapha schools are not Hizbullah schools, 
such as Al-Mahdi. Both Al-Mahdi and Al-Mustapha follow the Islamic doctrine since the core 
of both schools is Islam; hence it is only normal that both schools commemorate the same 
events, activities, and occasions. Nevertheless, both schools are associated together under an 
Islamic collaborative assembly which includes JTDI, Al-Imdad, Al-Mabarrat, the Islamic 
Institute for Education and Teaching, and Amal Educational Institutions. These organizations 
conduct bi-monthly meetings to discuss curriculum and education matters.  
 Dr. Qallot claims that unlike Al-Mahdi schools, the total enrollment of Al-Mustapha 
schools increases at a slow pace. He asserts that when establishing Al-Mahdi schools, 
Hizbullah had set the goal of educating the maximum possible number of students and 
eliminating ignorance among its adherents. This is why their schools expanded abruptly. Al-
Mustapha schools on the other hand, fear that their abrupt increase might affect the 
educational services offered at their schools, and hence do not expand quickly. Of course, he 
rejects the argument that Al-Mustapha schools are for the wealthy strata of population, 
claiming that only 35-40% of the students belong to upper-class, while 60% are middle or 
low class. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the percentage of upper-class students in Al-
Mahdi or Al-Imdad schools might be lower. But Al-Mustapha’s scholarship programs enable 
many students to enroll in the schools. The schools offer social-humanitarian scholarship to 
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orphans or children of ‘martyrs’ that ranges from 70 up to 100%; honor scholarship to those 
students who have excellent performance; and top student scholarship to the most 
outstanding students.
38
 
 Dr. Qallot, who has been the principal of the Haret Hreik Al-Mustapha School since 
seven years, refuses the misconceptions that Al-Mustapha schools are too much religious. He 
claims that religion is only taught twice per week in Al-Mustapha schools, and that this is 
approved by the Lebanese educational system.
39
 Furthermore, foreign language and scientific 
subjects are stressed even more than Arabic. Dr. Qallot argues that the textbook, “Al Islam 
Risalatuna” (Islam is our mission), used for all classes in Al-Mustapha schools, is more of a 
moral book, teaching values and moral principles. Its contents educate the students to 
become loyal and good citizens. In his words: “We build the personality of our students so 
that they have Islam in their thoughts, are nationalists by character, have Lebanon as their 
country, abide by the country’s rules and regulations, and acknowledge all differences in the 
Lebanese society”.40 
 Yet, despite all the claims that Al-Mustapha schools are not Hizbullah schools, and 
that only the Islamic collaborative assembly connects them, when asked about the role of Al-
Mustapha schools in building the “resistance society”, Dr. Qallot stresses that their role is 
fundamental and crucial; Al-Mustapha schools are play a major role in building this society. 
In these schools, there are no “resistance” subjects to be taught; however, in civics or any 
other class, examples are brought from the “resistance society” rather than outside the Shi‘a 
community. In addition, liberation day, ‘Ashoura, and similar events are all commemorated 
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in the schools. Last but not least, “resistance society” is built by emphasizing that Israel is the 
enemy, and the people of Lebanon are sisters/brothers.
41
 
 4.3.3-Al-Imdad Schools 
 Al-Imdad schools are part of the Al-Imdad association that was established in 
Lebanon in 1987 - and licensed by the Lebanese state in 1988 - as a branch of the mother Al-
Imdad association in Iran. Although the organization is linked to the Iranian association, it 
has nevertheless developed a Lebanese identity (Love 2010). Originally founded to help poor 
families who are unable to benefit from other organizations related to Hizbullah like Al-
Shahid or Al-Jarha foundations (Deeb 2006: 90), Al-Imdad has five schools and several 
handicapped and rehabilitation centers. It provides financial aid, in kind donations, 
emergency aid, medical, social, and educational services. In addition, it provides monthly 
incomes to 3360 families and cares for more than 4,000 orphans.
42
 The association is similar 
to Hizbullah associations and organizations, but here only the educational institutions will be 
discussed. 
 Like Al-Mahdi or Al-Mustapha schools, Al-Imdad schools are parallel in terms of the 
educational services that are rooted in Islamic values and dogmas. They follow the Shi‘a 
calendar based on Shi‘a events and commemorations. Moreover, similar to Al-Mahdi 
schools, the tuition fees of Al-Imdad schools are negligible. The aim is to educate the poor 
populations that are not able to receive education otherwise. The schools are located in areas 
where Shi‘as are not necessarily the dominant sect but in regions where poor Shi‘a 
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population reside. According to the latest studies, Al-Imdad provides education to 4,395 
students.
43
 
 The socio-economic status of the students of Al-Imdad schools varies from very poor 
to lower middle class and there are schools in Bartoun, West Bekaa, and Kesserwan (Le 
Thomas 2010). Below is a table summarizing the 5 Al-Imdad schools. 
Table 4.3: Geographical distribution of Al-Imdad schools:
44
 
  School District Founded From grade To Grade Instructed languages 
1 
Moujamma' Shahid 
Bajiji 
West Bekaa 1992 Kindergarten Grade 12 Arabic, English, & French 
2 
Moujamma' Ali Ben 
Abi Taleb Al Tawbawi 
Kesserwan 1993 Kindergarten Intermediate Arabic & French 
3 
Moujamma' Imam 
Khomeini Al Tarbawi 
Beirut 1996 Kindergarten 
Grade 12 + 
technical 
Arabic, English, & French 
4 
Moujamma' Imam 
Baqir Al Tarbawi 
Batroun 2001 Kindergarten Grade 12 Arabic, English, & French 
5 
Moujamma' Ahl El 
Beit Al Tarbawi 
Beirut 2004 Kindergarten Grade 12 Arabic, English, & French 
  
It is worth noting that other leading Shi‘a figures have also established schools and hence 
educated many poor and underprivileged children. As early as 1978, Sayyed Mohammad 
Hussein Fadlallah, a prominent Shi‘a marja’ (religious reference) established the Al-
Mabarrat Charitable Association (henceforth Al-Mabarrat) to distribute charity and aid to 
the needy. Today, Al-Mabarrat has expanded to become a much wider association including 
hospitals, cultural centers, institutions for the physically disabled, businesses, in addition to 
six orphanages and 14 schools (Deeb 2006: 88-89).  
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 The Amal movement also opened it own schools during the last decade of the 20
th
 
century, following Hizbullah’s huge success with its social institutions and attracting a 
substantial part of the Shi‘a population. Thus, with the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, 
Amal established its first school in Nabatieh district. At present the movement has 8 schools 
and 6 technical institutes, with an overall total of 12000 students (Khreiss 2008). Like 
Hizbullah, Amal schools aim at establishing faithful citizens; however, unlike the party, 
Amal’s schools generate their income from the tuition fees of the students and that is why 
their expansion is graudate (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008: 77). 
 From what preceded, it is easy to conclude that the three schools Al-Mahdi, Al-
Mustapha, and Al-Imdad are very similar in terms of rituals, behavioral standards, religion 
icons, and Shi‘a commemorations. The three of them stress the importance of religion 
education, directly linking it to raising morals in society and establishing loyalty and 
patriotism (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008: 66). Moreover, these schools directly contribute to 
raising the self-esteem of the Shi‘a population in Lebanon and grant them a sense of pride in 
their sect. Therefore, even though only Al-Mahdi are Hizbullah schools, the other two also 
have also fundamental roles in building and expanding the network of the resistance society, 
an aim that is so essential to Hizbullah. Moreover, although these schools are not 
homogenous when it comes to location, - Al-Mustapha schools mainly being present in areas 
where Shi‘as are the majority, whereas Al-Mahdi and Al-Imdad being more spread all around 
Lebanon (Hamzeh 2004: 56) – these schools complement each other and homogenize Shi‘a 
areas ideologically and culturally, mobilizing the targeted populated and consolidating the 
Shi‘a identity (Le Thomas 2010).  
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4.4-Al-Mahdi Scouts 
 Established in 1985, some scholars assert that the existence of Al-Mahdi scouts is a 
verification of the vision of Hizbullah to protracted war (Love 2010). The Al-Mahdi scouts 
are regarded as one of the 29 scout groups existing in Lebanon, many of which belong to 
sectarian or political parties. The scout association has a permit from the Ministry of 
Education and Higher Education, granted in 1992, and later became part of the Federation of 
Lebanese Scouts. The movement admits boys from age 8 till 16, and organizes activities just 
like any other scout group. However, the Al-Mahdi scout association is established in order to 
prepare an Islamic generation and attract Shi‘a children and adolescents to influence their 
minds and hearts. 
 Just like any other Boy Scout group over the world, the Al-Mahdi scouts organize 
camps and practice activities such as swimming, building campfires, and tying knots. Even 
when looking at their camp site from a distance, they give the impression to be regular Boy 
Scouts until one comes closer and sees the big posters of Imam Khomeini and Sayyed 
Hassan Nasrallah. The picture of Imad Mughniyeh is placed inside the camp, as a role model 
for these youth (Worth 2008). These scouts differ from regular scout groups in that they 
receive visits from Hizbullah fighters who come and talk about military warfare. They also 
have activities such as teaching Islamic doctrines and principles, aside from the regular social 
ones. In addition, they receive trainings, and have marching movements that are far harder 
and more militaristic than other scout groups (IICC 2006). Furthermore, the number of Al-
Mahdi scouts is much larger than any other scout group in Lebanon, estimated to be 60,000 
(Worth 2008). 
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 The Al-Mahdi scouts create a connection between Hizbullah and these youth at a very 
early age. By the time the scouts reach their final year at the association, they have already 
become ready party fighters, ready to sacrifice their lives in the name of Hizbullah (IICC 
2006). Hence, it is of no surprise that some of the graduates of the Al-Mahdi scouts will work 
in the huge bureaucracy of Hizbullah, while others will be part of the military wing of the 
party. And the remaining young men will join the party’s loyal base (Worth 2008).  
 Dr. Qallot notes that most of the Al-Mahdi scouts do not belong to Hizbullah 
affiliated schools.
45
 There are scouts who come from public schools. Yet, these young boys 
become part of Hizbullah, participate in the party’s events, and adhere and commit 
themselves to Islam (Worth 2008). The Al-Mahdi scouts undergo military trainings and learn 
about Hizbullah and Shi‘a Islam doctrines, just as students in Hizbullah schools do. Hence 
they are viewed as a continuation for the ideological thought of Hizbullah and the creation of 
the resistance society. Today, Hizbullah succeeds in preparing generations that are both, 
close to the party and acquire deep Islamic faith. Whether through its schools or its scout 
association, Hizbullah is spreading its network of resistance society and increasing the 
number of party adherents. 
 4.5-Conclusion 
 This chapter shows how politics, school, and religion come together within a 
comprehensive model set by Hizbullah that fosters “resistance-oriented behavioral patterns” 
among its youth (Le Thomas 2010). Although Hizbullah educational institutions target the 
poor strata of the population, like the party’s social services, these educational institutions 
enhance the image of the party as a service provider, but go beyond that because they also 
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mobilize the Hizbullah youth and educate them according to Hizbullah ideology. The party 
makes sure to train these young children so that they continue the party’s struggle against 
Israel (Worth 2008).  
 Hizbullah schools are thus a counterpoint to the Christian cultural/ideological 
hegemony. Furthermore, the party’s affiliated or owned schools not only focus on 
educational standards, but also on developing a unique Lebanese Shi‘a identity (Shaery-
Eisenlohr 2008: 84-85). The party has been very successful in mobilizing its youth more than 
any other sect in Lebanon. This has gained Hizbullah a huge support base and a religious 
youth, despite the secular society of Lebanon (Worth 2008). However, Hizbullah’s 
educational institutions and its vast scholarship programs hinder the development of the 
public schools of Lebanon. The low tuition fees that the party sets attract students who would 
otherwise enroll in public schools. But just like the social service system of Hizbullah, this 
also contradicts the socio-economic thought of the party, which is based on a statist rather 
than a liberal model. 
 Hizbullah is expanding its educational institutions because schools are the effective 
tools to reshape society. This expansion is in turn provides the party extensive cultural 
hegemony over Lebanese Shi‘as. Establishing schools in Shi‘a dominant areas in South, 
Bekaa, and Southern suburbs of Beirut not only aims at bringing these educational 
institutions close to the Shi‘a community, but it also brings these three Shi‘a regions closer 
on the social, political, and cultural levels. Whether through social organizations, educational 
institutions, or scout movements, at present, Hizbullah is effectively expanding its network of 
resistance society. This, in turn, is expanding the party’s control in the Shi‘a society. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
5.1-General Findings and Conclusion 
 This thesis examined Hizbullah’s capabilities in the social and educational sectors. It 
represented the party as a social and educational service provider, and illustrated how these 
two also constitute important pillars for the party aside from its political and the military 
strengths. Today, what enables Hizbullah to penetrate Lebanese society is the party’s charity 
and service orientation more than its military and political achievements. Ideology is 
certainly fundamental, but what gained the party its huge support are its social and 
educational services that improve the livelihood of many Shi‘as and challenges stereotype 
about their underdeveloped socioeconomic status in Lebanon. 
 This thesis began with a brief introduction to the evolution of Hizbullah from a 
radical military movement denoted only by military warfare, with an uncompromising stance 
towards the Lebanese political system, to a Lebanese political party characterized by political 
accommodation in the same sectarian system that the party had long resented. This shift 
occurred in 1992, after the end of the Lebanese civil war. The party began to participate in 
Lebanese parliamentary elections and was institutionalized and transformed into an ordinary 
political party. However, it did not take part in the formal executive power, first because 
some political groups refused to recognize Hizbullah’s resistance role, and second because of 
the post-Ta’if governments’ privatization strategies. Hizbullah opposed postwar neoliberal 
practices, calling for state interventionist measures. Nevertheless, it soon emerged as a 
81 
 
shadow organization to the state, practicing the same socioeconomic policies it was 
denouncing. 
 Indeed, when the party acknowledged the Lebanese multi-sectarian state, it defined 
its desired state as an interventionist one, in control of its citizens’ lives, unlike what 
contemporary liberal thought call for. Yet, looking at the present status of Hizbullah, one can 
see the vast organizations and networks that the party has established. These networks have 
led to the enhancement of the Shi‘a private sector, contributing to the socioeconomic rise of 
the Shi‘as as well as creating a certain type of communal pride. All these institutions come in 
harmony with the neoliberal school of thought and not the ideas of state interventionist 
thought that Hizbullah calls for officially. Their decentralized make-up and mode of work 
clearly contradict Hizbullah’s socio-economic thought. The party who, in theory, condemns 
privatization and calls for all types of developmental reforms through the state, which in turn 
would make the state stronger and its image credible, has in fact established its own networks 
of socio-economic institutions and encouraged private initiatives without seeking their 
pursuit through the state.  
 Although contradicting its social thought, the party’s social services are the 
instrumental factors behind its popularity and enable it to gain the political loyalty of large 
sectors of the Shi‘a population. Ideology certainly has its role in enhancing Hizbullah’s 
image; but with its vast social service sector and neoliberal practices, Hizbullah cements its 
relationship with its adherents, and shifts their allegiances to itself rather than to the state, 
thus hindering the advancement of the strong state its calls for in Lebanon. Hence, as 
Hizbullah grows stronger, the Lebanese state grows weaker. Nonetheless, Hizbullah did not 
intend to merely elevate the Shi‘a by establishing social service organizations; the party 
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wanted to establish a resistance society and provide all its needs to keep this society 
committed and effective. It thus linked the developments of its social institutions to the 
concept of the resistance society. Therefore, the party worked on consolidating a resistance 
culture and identity among its supporters, and hence enhancing its reputation through this 
resistance identity.  
 The thesis also highlighted the importance of educational services in enhancing 
Hizbullah’s popularity. The party saw education as another tool to mobilize its supporters, 
and like its social networks, educational services became tools to establish political loyalty 
and strengthen the party’s ties with its community, especially when this education came in 
accord with the culture of the resistance society and embraced it. Hizbullah established its 
schools in Shi‘a dominant areas in the South, in Bekaa, and in the Southern suburbs of 
Beirut. The party-controlled or party-affiliated schools follow homogeneous programs, 
commemorate the same events, and organize activities which homogenize Shi‘a areas 
ideologically and culturally, mobilizing the targeted populated and consolidating the Shi‘a 
identity. The Al-Mahdi, Al-Mustapha and Al-Imdad schools stress the importance of religious 
education, directly linking it to raising morals in society and establishing loyalty and 
patriotism. Moreover, these schools directly contribute to raising the self-esteem of the Shi‘a 
population in Lebanon and grant them a sense of pride in their sect. Therefore, they directly 
contribute in building and expanding the network of the resistance society, an aim that is so 
essential to Hizbullah.  
 Finally the thesis sheds light on the Al-Mahdi scout movement to demonstrate how 
Hizbullah tries to connect with its youth at a very early age. The scout movement trains 
future Hizbullah fighters and bureaucrats. It teaches its youth Hizbullah and Shi‘a Islam 
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doctrines, just as Hizbullah schools do. Therefore, Al-Mahdi scout movement is viewed as a 
continuation of the ideological thought of Hizbullah and a cornerstone for the creation of the 
resistance society. Through its educational and scout movements, Hizbullah has become 
successful in preparing generations that are both, close to the party and acquire deep Islamic 
faith. The party wants to make sure that it trains these young children so that they continue 
the party’s struggle against Israel. This leads to spreading the party’s network of resistance 
society as well as increasing the number of Hizbullah adherents. 
 Today, Hizbullah’s social service and educational units are integrated into Lebanese 
society, particularly in areas where the Shi‘a are a majority. The electoral gains of Hizbullah 
in parliamentary and municipal elections are a reflection of the success of the party’s social 
and educational services. It is not a secret that the work of Hizbullah is politically motivated. 
Even Hizbullah cannot deny that the services it provides are being a recruitment tool for the 
party. However, what makes the party successful is the lack of shortage of fund which comes 
either through Iran, religious donations, or private businesses, whether legitimate or not. 
Moreover, the effectiveness and professionalism that the party acquires, its deep knowledge 
about the needs of the Shi‘a community, its decentralized mode of performance, and the 
holistic structure of the provided services all contribute to the enhancement of Hizbullah’s 
popularity and tightening its control. 
 This thesis concluded that in case of Hizbullah, politics, school, and religion come 
together within a comprehensive model that fosters “resistance-oriented behavioral patterns” 
among its youth (Le Thomas 2010). Although Hizbullah’s educational institutions and social 
services target the poor strata of the population thus enhancing the image of the party as a 
service provider, they also go beyond that because they mobilize Hizbullah adherents in 
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general and youth in particular, and educate them according to the party’s ideology. The 
party’s educational and social networks not only focus on improving standards, but they also 
emphasize the development of a unique Lebanese Shi‘a identity. At present, Hizbullah 
succeeds in maintaining a huge support base and a religious community. Yet, both the 
educational and social units of the party operate in conflict with its state-interventionist 
ideology. Much like the social services of the party, which hinder the advancement of 
services by the Lebanese state, Hizbullah’s educational institutions and its vast scholarship 
programs hinder the development of the public schools of Lebanon. The low tuition fees that 
the party sets attract students who would otherwise enroll in public schools. Therefore, will 
ideology bend to practice when the latter results in double-edged advantages and benefits 
both to the party and to its adherents? Will Hizbullah acknowledge the conflict put forward 
in this thesis and modify either its strategies or thought? Only then will the party be 
considered genuine in advocating the emergence of a ‘strong, capable, and just’ state in 
Lebanon.   
 Writing about Hizbullah’s social and educational wing is not very common because 
all research concentrates on its military and political aspects. Hence this thesis contributes to 
the relatively scarce literature on this topic. Moreover, through interviews with Hizbullah 
official, the thesis tried to reconstruct the socio-economic thought of Hizbullah, considering 
this valuable both to the thesis and to socio-economic research about Hizbullah. Another 
contribution of this thesis is the updated statistical data collected through interviews. This 
was one of the major challenges of this thesis because of the party’s sensitivity in publishing 
numbers - especially after the July war - about the amount of assistance offered, or the 
number of wounded or martyred. Therefore, this study has combined theoretical and practical 
85 
 
aspects and has provided more recent data than what is available in books and research 
papers about Hizbullah, enabling the reader to have a better perception of the party’s current 
strategies and power sources. 
5.2-Hizbullah and the Current Regional Developments 
 In December 2010, Mohamad Bouazizi killed himself protesting against police 
treatment. What followed were pro-democracy popular uprisings that began in Tunisia but 
spread to many Arab countries. Egypt was next, Libya followed, and the uprisings stretched, 
all over the Arab world calling for the toppling of existing authoritarian regimes. In Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, the regimes were overthrown; Bahrain experienced severe 
uprisings; protests were witnessed in Iraq, Algeria, Jordan Morocco, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Oman, Sudan, and even the Western Sahara and Mauritania. Finally, Syria descended into a 
bloody civil war. These revolts became known as the Arab Spring, symbolizing the transition 
of these states towards democracy. 
 Hizbullah was affected directly by the Arab Spring. The party soon took the lead in 
the formation of June 2011 government. Yet the Arab Spring has affected the party 
negatively. As the upheavals and revolts began, Hizbullah did not hide its stance vis-à-vis 
existing ruling regimes. In Tunisia, the party supported the people and condemned the 
corrupt and authoritarian regime. In Egypt, Hizbullah’s hatred to Mubarak was always 
apparent, especially after the Egyptian authorities arrested a Hizbullah-led network in the 
country in 2009. In Libya, the party resented Qaddafi due to the latter’s involvement in the 
disappearance of Mussa Al-Sadr in August 1978. Hence the party condemned Mubarak and 
Qaddafi and called for their overthrow. Likewise, in all the states experiencing uprising in the 
Arabian Peninsula, Hizbullah supported the oppressed people against their authoritarian 
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regimes. Bahrain had a particular significance because the subjugated population were the 
Shi‘as repressed by the existing Sunni regime.  
 Hizbullah had already gained popularity among the Arab public, and was a credible 
movement especially after the liberation of South Lebanon in the May 2000 and the July 
2006 war with Israel. In the early phases of the Arab Spring Hizbullah followed its principles 
of defending social justice and fighting the rights of the oppressed. But what disturbed this 
model were the events that began in Syria in March 2011 (Spyer 2012). After condemning all 
the regimes and siding with the people, Hizbullah took side with the Syrian regime. This 
stance put the party on a collision course with Arab public opinion. Once viewed as their 
protector, Arab rebels charged Hizbullah with hypocrisy (Yacoubian 2011). Its position on 
Syria put Hizbullah on the wrong side of the Arab Spring. 
 Hizbullah’s siding with the Assad regime should not come as a surprise. Syria’s 
strategic position, its alliance with Iran, and its supply of arms to the party are what caused 
Hizbullah to side against the oppressed people and show allegiance to Bashar’s regime, thus 
tolerating his repressive acts. Regionally speaking, Hizbullah, Syria, and Iran form a tripartite 
alliance having common objectives and gains. Hizbullah will not act in a way that would 
undermine this alliance. This further shows how the party defines its priorities. Even when it 
considers itself as a resistance party appealing to the whole Arab region, its strategic ties with 
Iran and its own interests come first. 
 Even though the Arab Spring had a negative impact on Hizbullah, the situation in 
Syria is a major test to Hizbullah. Any change in Syria will have a destructive outcome for 
Hizbullah. Toppling Assad’s regime will not only destroy the Syria-Hizbullah-Iran axis, it 
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will also mean cutting off Hizbullah’s arms-supply routes. Hizbullah may then try to survive 
in the short-term, but its long-term survival will be undoubtedly threatened. 
5.3-Hizbullah’s Future 
 The Arab spring changed the political players in the region and gave birth to new 
ones with new dilemmas. Turkey became a key player, siding with the Arab public and 
condemning all the regimes. As such, Turkey’s credibility increased in the region and the 
country was seen as a better champion than any of Hizbullah or Iran. This concerned 
Hizbullah. And when Turkey became a haven for the Syrian refugees as well as its anti-
regime coalition officials, Hizbullah was further placed under pressure. Finally, Turkey’s 
increased role also threatened Iran’s stance vis-à-vis the Arab states. Therefore, Hizbullah 
and Iran were indeed losing. 
 Another serious challenge to Hizbullah that might rise in the near future is the 
emergence of the new Sunni Islamist regimes that will come to power in several Arab states. 
This can give rise to a regional sectarian power politics which might harm Hizbullah and its 
allies. Moreover, most likely, these regimes will not be interested in the Arab-Israeli cause. 
This will further trouble Hizbullah and make the party undergo modifications in its strategies 
and agenda. 
 Therefore, and given the loss in Hizbullah’s credibility and the problems of its Syrian 
ally, the party may try to balance all this by investing more domestically and turning inwards. 
Hizbullah may try to deepen its role and involvement in Lebanon’s politics and focus on a 
national agenda (Yacoubian 2011). Hizbullah may opt to expand its network of alliances with 
other Lebanese sects, aiming at emerging as the strongest player in the country. Hizbullah 
may not want to clash with Israel. It will work on being viewed as a clean political party. 
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Therefore, Hizbullah will try to win over the Special Tribunal of Lebanon by letting it die 
slowly.  
 On the non-political level, Hizbullah will try to consolidate its already existing 
powers. It will make sure it has the strength and power to fight enemies in case of war. On 
the social level, the party will invest more resources in the domestic front. Its social and 
charity networks will expand vastly. This will be the major source for it to retain its 
popularity. Ideology will continue to have a role, but the socio-economic power of Hizbullah 
will occupy a wider space in Hizbullah’s agenda. In the same vein, the party will try to be 
more independent financially. It will increase the businesses which generate income and 
expand its network of businesses even more. Neo-liberal practices will increase sharply but 
the party will do what it takes to guarantee survival. As the Arab world moves to a new era, 
Hizbullah will deepen the trend started in 1992, getting involved even more in Lebanese 
politics, as well as providing services and aid to its constituency more than ever. 
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2. Ali Fayyad, Member of the loyalty to the resistance parliamentary block in the 
Lebanese parliament, interview by author, Beirut, 2 August 2011. 
 
3. Kassem Qallot, Principal of Haret Hreik Al-Mustapha School since 2005, interview 
by author, Beirut, March 28, 2012. 
 
4. Mohammed Fneish, member of Hizbullah politburo and Minister of State for 
Administrative Reforms, interview by author, Beirut, 3 September 2011. 
 
 
 
